Some analysts contend that any significant change in Iran’s political system could rekindle debates over various governance models, such as federalism, autonomy, or broader decentralisation. These frameworks are increasingly considered as potential solutions to better accommodate the country’s ethnic and regional diversity and to promote a more equitable distribution of power. However, others argue that the future of Ahwaz—an Arab-majority region that contains the majority of Iran’s oil, gas, and water resources—will remain predominantly shaped by a complex web of regional and international dynamics, as well as internal developments within Iran itself.
The Ahwaz region’s future symbolises one of the most intricate historical and political questions in the Arabian Gulf. Marked by deep cultural roots, vast economic resources, and a long period of Arab rule before coming under Iranian control in the early decades of the twentieth century, Ahwaz has now re-emerged in political discourse amid rapid regional and international shifts.
The issue has drawn renewed attention particularly against the backdrop of escalating tensions and the ongoing confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel, alongside the possibility of broader changes in the regional balance of power.
History
The history of Ahwaz stretches back to ancient times. Historical sources indicate that the region was home to a succession of early civilisations that developed along the Karun River valley, also historically known as Dijil. Some accounts suggest that the Arameans were among the earliest peoples to settle there, establishing urban centres along the riverbanks and founding a capital referred to as Beth-Bakin.
Over the centuries, Ahwaz came under the influence of multiple civilisations, including the Elamites, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. During these periods, the city of Susa — known today as Shush — emerged as a major cultural centre before eventually falling to the Achaemenid Persians in the sixth century BC.
Following the Islamic conquests in the seventh century AD, the region was incorporated into the Arab-Islamic sphere after the battles of Qadisiyah and Ctesiphon in 17 AH (637 AD). It subsequently became part of the Islamic state and later the Abbasid Caliphate.
In the centuries that followed, several Arab emirates emerged in Ahwaz, including Bani Asad, Bani Amer, and Al Kathir, which exercised authority over large parts of the region and the eastern coast of the Arabian Gulf.
A major turning point came in the fifteenth century CE with the rise of Muhammad ibn Falah al-Musha’sha’i, who led a political and religious movement that established the Musha’sha’i state in 1436 CE. With its capital in Hawizeh, the state expanded its influence across extensive territories reaching into southern Iraq, parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and areas of southern and western Persia.
Geography and Economic Resources
Ahwaz is located in the south and southwest of present-day Iran, covering an area estimated at around 210,000 square kilometres according to some historical accounts. It is bordered by Iraq to the west, the Arabian Gulf to the south, and the Zagros Mountains to the north, extending eastwards toward the Iranian plateau. The region occupies a strategically important geographical position, linking Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian Gulf while also functioning as a major corridor overlooking the Gulf waters. Its fertile plains rank among the most prominent agricultural zones in the area, supported by a network of rivers led by the Karun River.
Ahwaz includes a number of historically significant cities, including Mohammareh, Ahwaz, Howeyzeh, Abadan, Fallahieh, Quneitra (Dezful), Shushtar, Behbahan, Izeh, Omidiyeh, Mashour, and Bushehr, as well as other urban centres in the provinces of Ilam and Hormozgan. Together, these locations have played a central role in the region’s economic and political development. Ahwaz is considered one of the most resource-rich regions in the Middle East. It contains a substantial share of Iran’s oil reserves, often estimated to rank second only to those of Saudi Arabia, with figures exceeding 200 billion barrels.
In terms of natural gas, Iran is widely regarded as the region’s leader and the world’s second-largest producer after Russia, with a significant portion of its reserves located in the Ahwazi Arab areas.
Oil was first discovered in the region in 1906 at the Masjed Soleiman field, formerly known as Naftun, north of Ahwaz. The city was later developed by the British to accommodate workers arriving from the neighbouring province of Lorestan, with the discovery marking a turning point in the region’s economic and political trajectory.
Today, Ahwaz includes numerous major oil and gas fields and hosts some of Iran’s most significant refining infrastructure, including the Abadan refinery, which for many years was among the largest in the world.
The region is also endowed with considerable agricultural capacity and water resources, alongside strategically important ports overlooking the Arabian Gulf.
Despite this wealth, many researchers note that much of the local Ahwazi Arab population continues to experience high levels of unemployment and poverty. Ahwazi activists frequently attribute these conditions to what they describe as systematic economic marginalisation by the Iranian authorities.
The Kaabi Rule: Enhancing the Arab Role
In the late seventeenth century, the Kaabi state was established by Sheikh Ali bin Nasser al-Kaabi in 1690 following the decline of the Musha’sha’ state. It consolidated Arab rule in the region, with the city of Muhammara serving as its political and economic centre.
The Kaabi state reached its height under Sheikh Khaz‘al bin Jaber al-Kaabi, who governed Ahwaz during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During his rule, Sheikh Khaz‘al developed extensive political ties with regional and international powers, including Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and several Arab leaders in the Arabian Gulf, most notably King Abdulaziz Al Saud.
He also played a visible role in supporting Arab causes. Muhammara, as the capital of the Ka‘abi state, became a hub of Arab political activity, where Sheikh Khaz‘al cultivated connections with leading Arab figures and participated in initiatives aimed at reinforcing Arab identity in the Gulf region.
Among the most prominent of these initiatives was the Fayliya meeting, which brought together Prince Khaz‘al, Sheikh Sabah al-Mubarak, and Talib al-Naqib of Iraq.
Fall of Arab Rule in Ahwaz
The Arab rule in Ahwaz came to an end in 1925, when Reza Shah Pahlavi militarily annexed the region into the newly established Iranian state following a complex military and political process.
Many historical accounts suggest that this move took place with British support or acquiescence, within the broader context of efforts to reshape the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf after World War I and strengthen the Persian state as a counterweight to expanding Russian influence in the region.
In April 1925, Sheikh Khaz’al al-Ka‘bi was arrested after reportedly being lured by the British into a meeting with Iranian forces. He was subsequently taken to Tehran, where he remained under house arrest until his death. The episode marked the end of local Arab rule in Ahwaz after centuries of relative autonomy.
Ahwaz Under the Pahlavis
Following Iran’s colonial annexation of Ahwaz, the Pahlavi regime implemented policies characteristic of colonial domination, aimed at integrating the region into a centralised Iranian state. These measures included renaming Arab cities, erasing the region’s and its Arab people’s identity, expanding settlement projects, and bringing Persian immigrants to settle in Ahwazi areas to alter the demographic landscape.
Through these colonial policies, the Iranian successive governments consolidated control over Ahwaz’s security, industry, and economy, while systematically marginalising the Arab majority. These practices have persisted into the present day, continuing within a framework of ethno-political securitisation that sustains colonial-style control and marginalisation of the Ahwazi Arab population in the region.
The scope of these policies extended even to personal identity, with naming practices for newborns influenced by broader efforts of Persianisation. At the same time, the region underwent significant economic changes driven by the expansion of oil extraction and the development of related infrastructure. However, these shifts did not necessarily translate into improvements at the local level, as many areas populated by Ahwazi Arabs continued to face deficiencies in services and infrastructure. At present, the Ahwazi territories have become one of the most heavily polluted areas, yet the local Ahwazi Arabs continue to suffer from health issues such as cancer and other diseases. Despite its status as a major resource hub for oil extraction, the region was reduced to an extractive zone, while its local Ahwazi population was marginalised and regarded as unwanted.
Ahwaz Under the Islamic Republic
In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Ahwaz witnessed a renewed wave of political and nationalist mobilisation. Political actors and Ahwazi Arab leaders, including Sheikh Muhammad Taher Al-Shubair al-khaghani, called for regional autonomy within the framework of the Iranian state.
Al-Shubair met Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, in Qom, while a delegation of thirty Ahwazi political figures travelled to Tehran to meet with the new authorities.
In this context, interim Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan visited Muhammara and promised that the Iranian constitution would take into account the demands of the Ahwazi Arab people.
These demands included recognition of the Ahwazi Arab people and guarantees of political and administrative representation proportional to their population, including participation in constituent and national assemblies as well as government institutions.
They also called for local self-governance, the establishment of Arabic-language courts to protect legal rights, Arabic-language education in schools and universities, and freedom for Arabic-language media and cultural programming without censorship.
Additional demands included prioritising employment for local residents in both public and private sectors, allocating a fair share of oil revenues to local development, restoring Arabic names to cities and villages, ensuring representation in the military, police, and senior administrative posts, and revisiting land distribution policies in favour of those who cultivate the land.
These demands were ultimately rejected by the new authorities, leading to clashes between Iranian forces and Ahwazi Arab protesters in some areas during the early months of the post-revolutionary period. Hundreds of Ahwazi Arab civilians were killed, injured, and many were subjected to extrajudicial executions with no trials reported. This event is known as Black Wednesday carnage among the Ahwazi people.
Since then, the relationship between the central government and Ahwaz has been marked by ongoing tensions and recurrent protests.
Each year, protests erupt in response to issues such as widespread discrimination, environmental devastation caused by Iran’s damming of rivers—leaving many Ahwazi areas suffering from severe water shortages—and systemic employment discrimination.
The local Ahwazi population continues to face systematic exclusion from industrial and government jobs, further deepening their marginalisation. Despite the local protests, the central government has consistently refused to address their demands; instead, it has responded with brutal force, deploying security forces from other regions to suppress the demonstrations. Arrests, imprisonments, and violent crackdowns have become routine, with authorities often charging Ahwazi protesters with security-related offences, accusations of separatism, or alleging links to regional foreign states.
These pretext charges are used to justify repression, silence dissent, and delegitimise the demands of the Ahwazi people. In fact, Iran employs ethno-securitisation policies against Ahwaz and its people—policies that have become the primary means of handling any peaceful protests or civic, cultural, and political activism. Instead of addressing grievances, the government labels such activism as a security threat. This approach has only intensified repression, widespread surveillance, and ongoing restrictions.
Over the next few decades, various political and cultural groups emerged, all fighting for recognition of the Ahwazi people’s rights. They called for more political participation, better economic opportunities, and the preservation of their cultural and national identity. But despite their efforts, very little changed. Many of these activists and leaders were quickly silenced—either imprisoned or forced into exile. Since Ahwaz is not well known internationally and little attention has been paid to its people’s cause and what Iran is doing against them, it became even easier for authorities to justify cracking down on their struggle for rights and suppressing their movement.
Demographics and Political Awareness
Despite the ongoing colonial settler policies—policies that involve settling outsiders, such as Persians, Lurs, and other ethnic groups into Ahwaz to dilute the Arab majority—Arabs still make up the majority of the region, with some researchers estimating the Ahwazi population at around 10 million.
These policies aim to change the region’s demographic makeup by encouraging the settlement of non-Arab groups in Arab-majority areas. As a result, many Ahwazi people have been displaced after their lands were confiscated by the state.
The political awareness of the Ahwazi people is often described as relatively high and expressed on three levels: cultural resistance through preserving the Arabic language and an Arab, Gulf-oriented identity; political resistance through the formation of parties and movements, uprisings, and engagement with Arab peoples and governments; and, at times, armed resistance against the central state despite limited financial and political support.
The Ahwazi Struggle
The Ahwazi struggle has taken multiple forms, ranging from political, cultural, and media activism to armed movements that emerged during different periods. Many of these movements focus their demands on self-determination, political participation, cultural and linguistic rights, economic development, and broader recognition. The Ahwazi diaspora also plays an active role in raising awareness of the issue through international human rights and media platforms.
The Future of Ahwaz Amid Regional Change
With rising tensions and ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, questions regarding the future of ethnic and national minorities within Iran — including Ahwazi Arabs — have once again re-emerged alongside renewed expectations of political change. Some analysts argue that any significant transformation in Iran’s political structure could reopen discussions surrounding federalism, autonomy, or broader political decentralisation. Others maintain that the future of Ahwaz will remain closely tied to regional and international power balances, as well as developments within Iran itself.
Whatever the case, the Ahwaz issue remains one of the most sensitive historical and political questions in the Arabian Gulf region. It sits at the intersection of historical, geographical, economic, and political factors, ensuring its continued relevance in debates over the region’s future, particularly given estimates that Ahwaz contains a significant share of global oil and gas reserves.
Note: Some parts of this article were originally written in Arabic and published by Independent Arabia. They were translated into English by the staff of the Dialogue Institute for Research and Studies. Additional parts were added, and the staff provided further background information on the Ahwazi case to clarify it for readers.