Case Studies of Ethnic Minorities Flashpoints: South Azerbaijani Turks and Ahwazi Arabs in Iran
Historical Background: Iranian Azerbaijanis, commonly referred to as South Azerbaijani Turks, constitute Iran’s largest ethnic minority, with an estimated population of 30 to 40 million, accounting for roughly 30-40% of the country’s population. This predominantly Shi’a, Turkic-speaking community possesses deep historical roots in northwestern Iran. The geographical and cultural lineage of the Azerbaijani people was significantly altered by the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai, which partitioned their homeland between the Russian Empire and the Qajar dynasty, the ruling dynasty in what is now modern-day Iran. During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi from 1925 to 1941, the Iranian government implemented a strict assimilation policy aimed at promoting the Persian language and identity, often at the expense of non-Persian ethnic groups, including the Azerbaijani Turks. The use of the Azerbaijani language and the expression of cultural identity faced significant restrictions during this period.
Even during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s descendants, from 1941 up until the 1979 Islamic Revolution and since then during the rule of the theocratic regime, the rulers continued to view the struggle of Azerbaijanis to promote their own cultural identity through a security-oriented lens. Azerbaijani cultural and political activists have routinely been accused of posing a threat to Iranian national security and of fostering separatist tendencies—despite the fact that many Azerbaijanis, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (of mixed Azerbaijani descent) and current President Masoud Pezeshkian, have held prominent positions in the so-called Islamic Republic.
Iranian Policies and Azerbaijani Grievances
On paper, Article 15 of Iran’s post-1979 constitution permits the use of non-Persian languages in media and education; in practice, however, Azerbaijani Turks have long experienced restrictions on mother-tongue education and cultural expression. Many Azerbaijanis view the economic neglect and cultural marginalisation of their provinces as part of a systematic state-sponsored colonial policy. This policy appears to be aimed at encouraging the Azerbaijani youth to migrate to Persian-majority regions, where they may be assimilated and become detached from their own, economically underdeveloped areas. Persian chauvinism has, at times, intensified its racial humiliations in media, with a commonly cited slur—“Torke khar” (“Turkish donkey”)—serving as an example of the derogatory attitudes held by some Persians toward Azerbaijanis.Contrary to many developed countries that implement anti-racism laws to combat ethnic and racial discrimination, the Iranian state and its media—including official, semi-official, and television channels— promote racist ideas and language against Turks without any accountability or fear of judicial consequences. Under various pretexts, they denigrate and humiliate Turkish people, mocking their accents and culture and portraying them as backwards and stupid. This racist rhetoric, which is widespread and deeply ingrained within Persian society, is not limited to Turks; similarly negative, antagonistic views are also directed at Arabs, further perpetuating a culture of intolerance.In recruiting personnel from among this population, Iranian state officials have been careful to integrate only those Azerbaijani willing to wholly abandon their own cultural identity and be blindly loyal to and defensive of the Persian supremacist state identity to defend it and promote it.
The Azerbaijanis are often referred to as a ‘pillar’ of Iran as a country, and many individuals from this group have ascended to elite positions, including former prime ministers and clerics. This level of integration, along with a shared Shi’a faith, has contributed to limiting support for autonomy. Unlike other ethnic groups in Iran, such as the Kurds, Ahwazi Arabs, or Baluchis, Azerbaijani Turks have never launched an armed insurgency. Nevertheless, periodic unrest arises when Azerbaijanis feel insulted, oppressed and discriminated against.
Key Incidents and pro-independence and seeking autonomy Currents: Several notable episodes illustrate Azerbaijanis’ fraught status in Iran:
1945–46 Azerbaijan People’s Government: In the chaos after World War II, South Azerbaijani leader Ja’far Pishevari set up an autonomous “Azerbaijan People’s Government” in Tabriz. It lasted one year; when the Soviets withdrew, Iran’s army reasserted control, killing thousands of Azerbaijanis in reprisals. This early secession attempt left a legacy of mistrust.
1981 Tabriz Unrest: Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, an uprising erupted in Tabriz, partly led by Azerbaijani cleric Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s followers. Tehran responded with heavy force, even deploying tanks. Hundreds of ethnic Azerbaijanis were executed in the crackdown, signalling Khomeini’s zero tolerance for any form of autonomy or self-rule – even within a Shi’ite Turkic population that had largely supported the revolution.
2006 Cartoon Protests: A state newspaper’s publication of a cartoon perceived to be calling Azerbaijanis ‘cockroaches’ ignited mass protests across Turkish-majority cities. Tens of thousands took to the streets in Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil, Zanjan, Qashqai, and even Tehran. While the regime quickly shut down the newspaper and arrested the editor, it also unleashed the Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia on protesters, arresting hundreds of activists. The unrest revealed simmering ethnic resentment over cultural disrespect and economic woes, with the anger at the offensive cartoon simply serving as a trigger to unleash this longstanding anger.
Second Karabakh War Protests (2020): When war erupted between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran’s Azerbaijani public rallied strongly to their ethnic kin across the border. Pro-Azerbaijan demonstrations broke out in major South Azerbaijani cities (Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil, Zanjan, and Tehran), with crowds calling for the “liberation of Karabakh”, with dozens of protesters arrested. Tehran, officially neutral, felt pressured, with the regime eventually echoing Azerbaijani talking points about Armenian-occupied territories to placate its restive Azerbaijani minority. The Karabakh episode underscored Iranian Azerbaijanis’ cross-border nationalism and Iran’s fear that external conflicts could stoke what Tehran viewed as domestic separatism.
“Freedom, Justice, National Government!” (2022): During Iran’s countrywide protests in late 2022, Azerbaijani Turks in Tabriz and other northwestern cities adopted the slogan ‘Azadliq, Adalat, Milli Hükümet’ (‘Freedom, Justice, National Government’). This slogan harkened back to the short-lived autonomous Azerbaijani government of 1945–46, essentially serving as a coded call for self-determination. Iranian authorities were quick to label the detained protesters as “separatists” and advocates of “pan-Turkism,” lumping them together with others perceived as subversives. The fact that some ethnically Persian and other dissidents also frowned on the slogan shows that even Iran’s opposition is divided on the nationalities issue. Still, the resurgence of such ethno-national demands – amid a broader anti-regime uprising – was indicative of the Azerbaijani Turks’ distinct identity within Iran.
Tehran’s Response: Iran’s government consistently frames any Azerbaijani Turk activism for language rights or autonomy as a national security threat driven by foreign manipulation. State media and officials deride ethnic activists as “separatists” and “pan-Turkists”, claiming that they’re acting on behalf of Türkiye or Azerbaijan. Security forces (led often by ethnically Persian commanders) have not hesitated to use massively disproportionate violence, as seen in the examples above. Even cultural demands like allowing the teaching of Azerbaijani Turkish in schools or environmentalists’ campaigns like the calls to protect Lake Urmia (a rapidly shrinking lake in Iran’s Azerbaijani region) are viewed through a security lens. Iran’s intelligence service closely monitors Azerbaijani civil society, with harassment and arrests of Azerbaijani intellectuals, journalists, and poets on charges of ‘sedition’ being commonplace. The regime also exploits divide-and-rule tactics – for instance, encouraging rivalry between Azerbaijanis and Kurds in West Azerbaijan province. Ironically, the integration of many Azerbaijanis into the state power structure (including the Supreme Leader, military officers, and bureaucrats) means the Azerbaijani community, or at least a vocal loyalist faction within it, is deeply embedded in the state’s ruling system. This has so far prevented any mass defection or insurgency – as analysts note, South Azerbaijani Turks “do not pose a threat to the state” in the way armed Kurdish or Baluchi rebels have done. Still, Iran’s leadership remains acutely nervous about Azerbaijani nationalism, especially given Azerbaijan’s and Türkiye’s interest in the issue.
Türkiye’s Ties and Engagement
Türkiye shares a deep-rooted connection with Iran’s Azerbaijani Turks based on ethnic, linguistic, and cultural affinities. Azerbaijani Turkish is mutually intelligible with Turkish, and many Iranian Azerbaijanis(South Azerbaijani Turks) are regular consumers of Turkish television and media. Türkiye’s development as a modern Turkic nation has made it a natural point of cultural reference and interest for some Iranian Azerbaijanis. This form of “soft power” has been reinforced through satellite television, with Turkish broadcasts reaching Iranian Azerbaijani regions like Tabriz since the 1990s, contributing to a cultural affinity that transcends borders. In addition, Türkiye has gradually expanded its cultural engagement through public diplomacy.For instance, the Turkish consulate in Urmia City (West Azerbaijan Province) has reportedly supported cultural initiatives and networking opportunities for Azerbaijani intellectuals, helping foster a renewed appreciation for Turkic heritage and language. These efforts have resonated in local discourse — with some municipal councils in Iran’s Azerbaijani regions increasingly advocating for using Azerbaijani Turkish in official and community settings. While this cultural revival is largely organic, it has occasionally caused tension with Persian or Kurdish communities, reflecting the broader dynamics of identity and representation within Iran.Despite this, however, Ankara’s official diplomatic stance on South Azerbaijanis has been cautious and pragmatic.
Türkiye values its political and economic relationship with Tehran and has, for many years, refrained from overtly supporting Iranian Azerbaijani autonomy. Notably, in the mid-2000s, Türkiye even banned an expatriate Azerbaijani TV station (Gunaz TV) from broadcasting via Turkish satellite due to its hardline pro-independence content. These moves signalled Ankara’s respect for Iran’s territorial integrity despite pressure from pan-Turkic nationalists. Turkish officials have generally avoided inflammatory rhetoric about ‘South Azerbaijan’ – with one major exception: the incident of President Erdoğan’s “Aras River” poem. In December 2020, while celebrating Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia, Erdoğan publicly recited a poem lamenting how the Aras River forms a border that “separated Azerbaijan” (implying northern Azerbaijan and South Azerbaijan should be one). Tehran reacted furiously, with Iran’s then-foreign minister Javad Zarif blasting the choice of poem, and a top IRGC general warning that Iran “will not allow” its unity to be threatened. The poem episode led to diplomatic protests and underscored Iranian fears of Turkish irredentism. While Ankara downplayed it as a misunderstanding, the damage was done – Iran’s suspicions of Türkiye fanning Azerbaijani nationalism grew. Indeed, Iran’s military conducted snap drills near the Azerbaijan border afterwards, and in turn, Azerbaijan and Türkiye held joint exercises as a show of solidarity.Overall, Türkiye walks a fine line on the South Azerbaijani issue. On the one hand, Türkiye champions Turkic solidarity and has embraced Azerbaijan (the independent republic) as a close ally, which indirectly emboldens ethnic consciousness among South Azerbaijanis. Turkish media outlets often highlight issues like the rapid shrinking of Lake Urmia or Azerbaijani-language rights, framing them in a sympathetic light. On the other hand, Türkiye has not officially backed or supported any calls for Iranian Azerbaijani autonomy, and it is aware that crossing that line could trigger a major rift with Tehran. In some cases, indeed, Türkiye has even cooperated with Iran against dissidents: for example, in 2006, an exiled Iranian Azerbaijani activist leader, Mahmoudali Chehreganli, was temporarily barred from entering Türkiye at Iran’s behest. Such actions show Türkiye prioritising state-to-state relations over ethnic kinship.Nevertheless, Iran remains wary that Ankara (possibly alongside Baku and even Israel) might one day leverage the “Azerbaijani card” to destabilise Iran. Iranian strategists frequently claim that “pan-Turkism” is a tool of Turkish expansionism. In sum, the South Azerbaijani Turks are a latent flashpoint – mostly calm for now, but with the potential to inflame Iran–Türkiye tensions if regional dynamics shift unfavourably.
Ahwazi Arabs of the Ahwaz region
The term ‘Ahwazi Arabs’ refers to the ethnically Arab inhabitants of Iran’s south and southwestern provinces (historically also called Arabistan). Numbering between 8 to 10 million (estimates vary), they form a significant minority in the oil-rich lowlands bordering Iraq. The Ahwazi people are predominantly Muslim, both Shi’a and Sunni, and culturally and linguistically are Arab, speaking dialects of Arabic as their mother tongue.The Ahwazi Arab people’s presence in what are now southern and southwestern provinces of Iran dates back many centuries, and they have strong tribal ties across the Shatt al-Arab waterway with their Iraqi and Gulf Arab peers. Despite living in Iran’s most strategic province (home to the bulk of Iran’s oil reserves), Ahwazi Arabs have long complained of marginalisation – they suffer higher poverty and unemployment rates, face cultural assimilation pressures, and feel underrepresented in local governance. Tehran has often viewed its Arab minority with suspicion, in part due to the longtime ‘Arab-Persian tensions’ that have their roots in regional history and the Iran–Iraq War.
Grievances and Discrimination of the Ahwazi Arabs: Successive Iranian governments (both under the Pahlavis and the so-called Islamic Republic) have implemented policies that Ahwazi activists condemn as discriminatory. Under the Pahlavis, Arabic language education was forbidden, Arab place names were Persianised (even the once-autonomous region was renamed from Arabistan to Khuzestan), and a program of land redistribution was launched favouring Persians brought in from other regions. After 1979, the revolutionary regime initially courted the Arab minority with Islamic solidarity, but distrust soon prevailed – especially once Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, claiming to “liberate” Ahwaz for the Arabs. In response to Iranian oppression and the denial of their demands for autonomy in the early months of the Iranian revolution, many young Ahwazis joined the Ahwaz or Arabistan Liberation Front that was established in Iraq and fought against Iranian forces during the 1980–88 war. The conflict devastated most of the Ahwazi Arab rural and urban areas’ infrastructure and led to further militarisation of the Ahwazi areas.
In the decades since, the Ahwazi Arabs have continued to feel like second-class citizens. As evidence of this, they point to the chronic underdevelopment in the region, systematic marginalisation, employment discrimination, the construction of exclusive Persian-only settlements in their areas and successive environmental crises: rivers in the Ahwazi areas have been dammed or diverted, leading to water shortages and dust storms that locals attribute to Tehran’s neglect. Indeed, in early 2017, thousands of Ahwazis took to the streets protesting against chronic dust storms, air pollution, water cuts, and power outages; the unrest grew loud enough that President Rouhani personally travelled to Ahwaz to promise action. These socio-economic grievances often intertwine with ethnic identity – protesters chant in Arabic for rights, and slogans sometimes condemning the regime’s Persian dominance. Like Iran’s Azerbaijanis, Ahwazi Arabs also seek greater cultural recognition, such as the use of Arabic in schools and offices, which so far remains limited. Tehran’s response to Ahwazi discontent has frequently been securitised: officials blame foreign instigators and emphasise the risk of sectarian extremism or separatism taking root under the guise of Arab rights.
Major Incidents of Unrest: Compared to Iranian Kurds or Baluchis, the Ahwazi Arabs had been relatively quiescent for years, but the 21st century has seen several flare-ups:
2005 Ahwaz Unrest: In April 2005, a leaked letter (purportedly from a presidential advisor) suggested plans to ‘dilute’ the Arab population of the Ahwazi areas through introducing more ethnically Persian immigrants from other areas. Though the government claimed it was a forgery, the letter sparked mass protests and rioting in Ahwaz and surrounding towns. Clashes with security forces over several days left at least 20 people dead. Later that year and into 2006, a series of bombings rocked Ahwaz (targeting government buildings and oil facilities), which authorities blamed on Ahwazi armed groups. Dozens of AhwaziArabs were arrested, and some were executed for the bombings. The 2005–06 upheaval was a turning point, making Ahwazi Arab militancy visible. An Ahwazi group called the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) claimed responsibility for some attacks stating. Iran in turn accused British and Gulf Arab intelligence of fomenting the unrest.
2011 “Arab Spring” protests: Inspired by Arab Spring uprisings, Ahwazi activists called for a “Day of Rage” in April 2011 to demand reforms. Security forces preemptively cracked down, allegedly killing several demonstrators and arresting hundreds in sweeping raids. Iran again pointed fingers at foreign provocateurs. While not as large as in 2005, these protests showed ongoing restiveness.
2018 Military Parade Attack: On September 22, 2018, during a military parade in Ahwaz, gunmen opened fire on IRGC soldiers and spectators, killing 25 IRGC personnel. It was one of the deadliest terror attacks in Iran in years. Iranian leaders accused “Ahwazi political movements in exile” of orchestrating the attack. The IRGC later accused ISIS groups in Iraq and Syria of the attack and launched ballistic missiles at what it said was an ISIS/Arab militant base in eastern Syria in retaliation. The parade attack deeply rattled Iran’s security establishment.
Recent Protests: Ahwazi Arabs participated in the late 2019 nationwide protests over fuel prices and the late 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, though these were not purely ethnic in nature. Additionally the summer of 2021 saw large protests in Ahwaz over severe water shortages, which quickly took on anti-regime tones. Slogans like “By soul, by blood, we will take back Ahwaz” were reportedly heard – suggesting a mix of environmental grievance and local patriotism. Again, a harsh crackdown ensued, with security forces and IRGC units deployed to Arab areas.
Iran’s Tactics: Tehran’s security apparatus treats Ahwaz – which it refers to Khuzestan – as a highly sensitive frontier. The region is heavily garrisoned, and the Ministry of Intelligence regularly announces busts of “terrorist separatist cells” there In 2018, Iran’s intelligence minister claimed that over 20 plots had been foiled in border provinces, naming Arab regions alongside Kurdish and Baluch areas. Iranian courts have meted out severe sentences – including executions – to Ahwazi activists convicted of sabotage or militant activity. For example, in 2019, Iran executed several men accused of the 2018 parade attack, though rights groups contended that their confessions were forced. The regime also limits foreign media access to Ahwaz, hoping to prevent the international spotlight that Kurdish or Baluch issues sometimes get. There are reports of demographic engineering too: encouraging Persians to move to the Arab region’s cities (for jobs in the oil industry or government) while under-investing in rural Arab areas.
Culturally Persian is enforced as the official language in schools and offices and Arabic-language publications or Arab cultural associations face tight controls. All these measures aim to preempt any momentum towards independence.
Iran’s leadership often bundles the Ahwazi Arab issue together with sectarian extremism – noting that a subset of Ahwazi Arabs follow Sunni Islam (a minority within the ethnic minority) and claiming that this could make them susceptible to jihadist ideologies given the sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Even the fact that the majority of Ahwazis are Shi’a has ironically not spared them from suspicion; it simply means Tehran casts the Ahwazi struggle in ethnic or “Arab nationalism” terms instead of sectarian ones.Role of External Actors and Türkiye: Unlike the case of the Azerbaijani Turks, Türkiye has played little to no direct role in the Ahwazi Arab issue. The Ahwazi cause has instead been championed more by Arab Gulf states and diaspora groups in Europe. For instance, ASMLA, an Ahwazi pro-independence movement, operates in exile from places like Denmark and the Netherlands. There is scant evidence of Türkiye supporting Ahwazi militants or political movements – in fact, such support would be out of character for Ankara. Türkiye’s government generally opposes separatist or autonomous movements (given its own Kurdish issue) and maintains a principle of respecting Iran’s territorial integrity. Moreover, as a non-Arab Sunni-majority country, Türkiye has no ethnic or sectarian affiliation with Iran’s Arab Shia community that would naturally draw it into the fray.It has been alleged that Türkiye cooperated with Iran against certain dissidents. A notable example often cited is the November 2020 capture of Farajollah Cha’ab (Habib Chaab), an exiled Ahwazi pro-independence political figure and former leader of the Arab Struggle for the Liberation of Ahwaz(ASLMA) who was allegedly involved in planning the 2018 parade attack without clear evidence. Reports allege that Cha’ab was lured from his safe haven in Sweden to Türkiye under false pretences, where he was abducted by Iranian agents with the alleged involvement of a “third country.” However, this incident does not necessarily confirm direct cooperation by Türkiye; rather, it reflects the complex dynamics of the region. Moreover, after the incident, Türkiye publicly stated that the operation had been carried out by Iran, and shared detailed information about it in both its domestic media and Western outlets. It also arrested several individuals in connection with the case. These facts indicate that Türkiye does not view Ahwazi Arabs as a tool to use against Iran—unlike how Iran might attempt to use Kurdish militants against Türkiye.
In the broader regional context, the Ahwazi issue can feed into Iran–Arab rivalries (e.g. Saudi Arabia’s media frequently highlight the Iranian ethnic repression of Ahwazi Arabs in an effort to discredit Tehran). However, this is not a core driver of tensions between Iran and Türkiye. Türkiye has generally left the Ahwazi file to the Arab states and Iran. Ankara’s interests in the Arab Gulf lie more in maintaining good ties for trade and energy and balancing relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran rather than picking up minority causes. That said, instability in Ahwaz – for example, a major uprising or crackdown – could indirectly affect Türkiye if it impacts oil flows or regional security, but those are secondary concerns.
In summary, while the Ahwazi Arabs have serious issues with Tehran, Türkiye’s stance has been one of non-interference (and occasionally even tacit assistance to Iran’s counter-separatism efforts). Iran’s Ahwazi Arab cause remains an internal pressure point for Tehran, but one that thus far does not involve Türkiye as a protagonist.
Iran’s Support for Shi’ite Groups in Türkiye and the Region
As the self-declared leader of the Shi’ite Islamic world, Iran has actively tried to export its influence into Türkiye’s religious landscape, albeit with mixed success. Türkiye is a majority Sunni country, but it has a notable Alevi community (15–20% of the population) and a smaller number of Twelver Shi’a Muslims (often of Azerbaijani ethnicity, concentrated in Istanbul and areas near the Iranian border).
Tehran has long operated cultural and religious centres in Türkiye – for instance, an Iranian culture house in Ankara and local associations linked to Iran’s Ahl al-Bayt (Family of the Prophet) outreach programs. Ostensibly, these centres promote cultural exchange, but over time Turkish intelligence services grew concerned that Iran was covertly recruiting and radicalising Turkish Shi’ites and Alevis.
In 2012, an investigation by Türkiye’s counterterrorism units uncovered a secret IRGC Quds Force scheme to penetrate Türkiye’s Alevi and Shi’a communities . According to leaked case files, Iranian operatives and their Turkish proxies organised Tehran-funded trips for Turkish Alevi leaders to visit Shi’ite holy sites in Iran, and provided money and doctrinal training – essentially attempting to convert Alevis to Khomeinist Twelver Shi’ism and encourage them to become a pro-Iran lobby back home. (Alevis share some reverence for Shi’a imams but differ significantly in practice and theology, and many are secular-leaning, so Iran’s effort was a bold ideological gamble). The Qods Force plot allegedly even aimed to incite an Alevi uprising in Türkiye that Iran could exploit: Turkish prosecutors said the Iranian plan was to “religiously motivate Shias and Alevis to start an uprising” against the Turkish state. Concurrently, the scheme sought to “ethnically motivate Kurds to start a separatist insurgency” – suggesting Iran was ready to stir multiple fault lines in Türkiye if relations soured.When this plot (codenamed “Selam Tevhid” in Türkiye) came to light, it caused an uproar in Ankara. By 2014, however, the Turkish government – then led by Erdoğan – hushed up the investigation, wary of both embarrassing Iran and the fact that zealous investigators had implicated some of Erdoğan’s own political allies. Still, enough evidence had surfaced to illuminate Iran’s tactics.
Iran’s cultural diplomats and even some religious attachés were quietly expelled over the affair. Turkish officials publicly warned that foreign intelligence (implicitly Iran) was trying to “sow sectarian discord” within Türkiye. For Iran, the episode was a setback; Alevis largely remained loyal to their secular-leftist traditions and distrusted Tehran’s intentions. Indeed, the vast majority of Turkish Alevis rejected Iran’s outreach. As observers note, most Alevis in Türkiye support the republican, non-sectarian ethos and have little interest in clerical Shi’ite doctrine. Iran’s attempt to win them over or use them as a fifth column was mostly unsuccessful, but it left a residue of deep suspicion in Türkiye. Ankara became more vigilant toward Shi’ite religious NGOs and networks, fearing Iranian subversion. Meanwhile, Iran maintains ties with Türkiye’s small Twelver Shi’a population. These Turkish Shi’ites, who number perhaps a few hundred thousand, are largely ethnic Azerbaijanis in Istanbul (neighborhoods like Zeynebiye) and cities near Armenia/Azerbaijan. They celebrate Ashura and other Shi’a rituals publicly – sometimes with support from Iran. Iranian clerics and diplomats frequently attend Ashura ceremonies in Istanbul as guests, and Iran provides religious materials and scholarships to Caferi communities. This form of soft power – funding mosques, seminarian exchanges, inviting Turkish Shi’a to study in Qom – is Iran’s way of cultivating loyalty among Türkiye’s Shi’ite minority. Although it stays mostly within legal bounds, Türkiye’s security services still keep a close eye on it. Turkish media occasionally allege that Iran’s Quds Force uses pilgrimages as cover to recruit informants or that Iranian spies are coordinating with extremist Turkish Shi’a factions.In recent years, there have been reports of Türkiye arresting individuals accused of spying for Iran or planning attacks on Israeli and dissident targets on Turkish soil, indicating an ongoing covert war between Turkish and Iranian intelligence services even in addition to the sectarian outreach.
In summary Iran’s influence operation in Türkiye focuses on religious solidarity – building a pro-Iran network among Shi’ites and even Alevis – to counter Türkiye’s Sunni orientation. While largely thwarted, these efforts have contributed to bilateral mistrust and are a reminder that Iran and Türkiye’s rivalry isn’t just on distant battlefields but also playing out within each other’s societies.
Iran’s Backing of Shi’ite Militias in the Middle East
Beyond Türkiye itself, Iran’s assertive support for Shi’ite movements and militias across the Middle East has put it at odds with Türkiye’s regional vision. Over the past two decades, Tehran has developed what’s often called the ‘Axis of Resistance’ – a network of state and non-state actors aligned with Iran and largely rooted in Shi’ite identity or anti-Western ideology. Key elements of this axis include Lebanese Hezbollah, the powerful Shi’ite militia-cum-party that Iran helped create in the 1980s; a plethora of Iraqi Shi’ite militias are now incorporated under the PMF (Popular Mobilisation Forces) umbrella, many of which were armed and trained by Iran’s IRGC Qods Force; Bashar al-Assad’s former regime in Syria (dominated by Alawites, a sect with Shi’a links) alongside numerous Shi’ite militia fighters from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that Iran deployed to Syria in its recently thwarted effort to keep Assad in power; and smaller Gulf-based groups like Bahrain’s Shi’ite opposition and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran provides these groups with everything from funding, weapons, and military advisors to ideological indoctrination.
For Iran, such proxies extend its influence and create leverage against rival states. However, Türkiye – a Sunni-majority power with its own neo-Ottoman and pan-Sunni aspirations – views Iran’s militia network as a direct challenge to Ankara’s preferred regional order.The clearest arena of conflict has been Syria. Following the Syrian uprising in 2011, Syria was plunged into civil war, with Iran and Türkiye finding themselves backing opposite sides. Iran went all-in in its efforts to prop up Assad: IRGC generals coordinated Assad’s army operations, and Iran arranged for Hezbollah fighters and other Shi’ite militias (notably the Afghan Fatemiyoun brigade and Iraqi groups like Kataib Hezbollah) to fight in Syria. Türkiye, by contrast, supported the Sunni-majority Syrian opposition, providing arms and sanctuary to rebels and calling for Assad’s overthrow. This led to a proxy war on Syrian soil: Iran’s allied militias vs. Türkiye-aligned factions (and later, direct Turkish military interventions in northern Syria). By 2016–2020, Turkish troops clashed not only with Kurdish YPG forces in Syria but at times also with Assad’s Iranian-backed units. Notably, in February 2020, when Assad’s forces (aided by Iranian drones and Hezbollah fighters) attacked Idlib, Türkiye retaliated with air and artillery strikes that reportedly killed dozens of Syrian soldiers and some Hezbollah members. Turkish media highlighted how Hezbollah had even confronted Turkish troops, fueling anti-Iran sentiment in Türkiye. The Syrian war thus brought Iran and Türkiye dangerously close to direct confrontation, though both stopped short of a full military showdown, partly due to Russian mediation, and partly due to the downfall of the Assad regime in December 2024.In Iraq, a similar dynamic of rivalry emerged in the vacuum left by the fall of Saddam and the war against ISIS.
Iran threw its weight behind the Shi’ite-led government in Baghdad and sponsored militias (the PMF) that became the backbone of the anti-ISIS fight. Türkiye, while also battling ISIS, cultivated ties with different actors: it supported the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, as well as some Sunni Arab factions, seeking to limit Tehran’s dominance.After ISIS was defeated, the two regional powers vied for influence in Iraqi politics. Tensions spiked in 2017 when Iraq’s Shi’ite militias (guided by Iran’s Qassem Soleimani) moved to assert control over disputed territories like Kirkuk and Sinjar – areas where Türkiye had its own interests (the presence of a Turkmen population in Kirkuk, and Sinjar serving as a base for PKK Kurdish militants hostile to Türkiye).In the post-ISIS scramble, Iran-backed Shi’ite militias and Türkiye almost came into conflict. For instance, when pro-Iran PMF units and the PKK’s local Yazidi militia took over Sinjar in late 2017, Türkiye was incensed and launched airstrikes, considering this to be an Iranian-PKK collusion against Turkish interests. Türkiye has also kept troops at Iraq’s Bashiqa base against Baghdad’s wishes, citing the need to fight terrorism, which Iran-allied Iraqi militias see as a violation of sovereignty.
There have been rocket attacks on Turkish bases in Iraq by suspected Iran-aligned groups, especially as Türkiye continues assaulting PKK havens. Thus, while not as headline-grabbing as Syria, Iraq remains an arena where Iran’s and Türkiye’s preferred partners (Shi’ite vs. Sunni/Kurdish factions) jostle, occasionally exchanging.In Lebanon, meanwhile, Iran’s leverage via Hezbollah has far outweighed any Turkish influence.Türkiye has some cultural and charitable engagement with Lebanon’s small Sunni community and the Turkoman minority, but this has been unable to match Iran’s deep role through Hezbollah. That said, Türkiye keeps a close eye on Lebanon’s stability as part of the Eastern Mediterranean, and aligns with Qatar in providing support to Lebanon’s Sunnis.The more Iran has empowered Hezbollah to dominate Lebanon, the more Türkiye (along with other Sunni states) has fretted over Shi’ite hegemony in yet another country.Sectarian Geopolitics: Broadly, Iran’s patronage of Shi’ite militias and Türkiye’s backing of predominantly Sunni forces reflect a sectarian schism in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Tehran’s strategy has been to build a contiguous ‘axis’ from Iran to the Mediterranean – through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – by using Shi’ite proxies that owe their allegiance to Iran’s revolutionary ideology. Ankara, under President Erdoğan, has at times positioned itself as a champion of Sunni causes (though in a more subtle way than Saudi Arabia’s overt sectarianism). Türkiye supported the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni democratic movements during the Arab Spring, and in conflicts it often finds itself on the Sunni side of the divide – in Syria with the opposition, in Yemen siding with the Saudi-led coalition against Iranian-backed Houthis, as well as in Libya supporting a largely Sunni Islamist-leaning government against UAE/Egypt-backed forces. Türkiye’s Sunni-oriented geopolitical approach inevitably collided with Iran’s Shi’ite-centric axis.The two countries’ ambitions have turned many local conflicts into proxy battlefields between them. For example, in Syria, Iranian media derided Türkiye’s intervention as neo-Ottoman neo-Sunni expansionism, while Turkish media accused Iran of sectarian genocide against Sunnis in Aleppo.In Iraq, Türkiye’s calls for inclusion of Sunnis countered Iran’s push for Shi’ite majoritarian rule. Even in places like Yemen, President Erdoğan accused Iran of fueling turmoil by backing “terrorist groups” (the Houthis), prompting Iran’s Zarif to snap that Türkiye was making “strategic mistakes”. Although Türkiye is not sectarian in a doctrinal sense (the Turkish state remains fairly secular in governance), its geopolitical alignments since 2011 have largely put it in the Sunni camp vis-à-vis Iran.
Recent Flashpoints and Intelligence Reports
Turkish-Iranian rivalry has intensified in recent years, leading to pointed diplomatic exchanges and covert jousting:
Diplomatic Spat 2023–2025: Türkiye’s current foreign minister (and former intelligence chief) Hakan Fidan has been vocal in his condemnation of Iran’s meddling via militias. In a February 2025 Al Jazeera interview, Fidan openly criticised Iran’s reliance on proxy militias, saying it cost Tehran more than it benefited them, and warning that if Iran “supports a group to stir unrest” in Türkiye’s neighborhood (alluding to Kurdish armed groups in Syria), then Türkiye could “support a group in your country” in return.This thinly veiled threat – essentially hinting Türkiye might back Iranian Azerbaijani or other dissidents if Iran doesn’t back off the PKK/YPG – caused an uproar in Tehran. Iran’s foreign ministry summoned Türkiye’s ambassador in March 2025 to complain about Fidan’s “inappropriate comments,” stressing that such remarks could lead to “tensions and disagreements” if not reined in. A top adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei even warned that Iran “will not allow any country” to undermine its regional ties and told Turkish officials to avoid “baseless allegations”.Ankara, for its part, called in Iran’s chargé d’affaires to object to criticisms by Iranian officials, asserting that foreign policy differences shouldn’t be exploited for domestic politics. This tit-for-tat shows how Syria (and, to a lesser extent, Iraq) have brought Iran–Türkiye friction into the open. Notably, analysts interpreted Fidan’s statements as Türkiye leveraging the Azerbaijani separatist card against Iran – a sign that Ankara might reconsider its restraint if provoked. Tehran’s immediate defensive response underscores its acute sensitivity to that threat.
Mutual Accusations of Supporting Kurdish Militants: Türkiye has repeatedly accused Iran of covertly aiding the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) or its Syrian YPG branch, especially when it serves Iran’s interests against Türkiye (Iran–Türkiye proxy conflict – Wikipedia) Turkish security sources claim Iran at times gives refuge or intelligence to PKK units attacking Türkiye or turns a blind eye to PKK presence in Iranian border areas. In fact, Iran historically allowed the PKK to maintain camps in Iran during the 1980s–90s as a pressure tactic on Türkiye, until briefly expelling them under Turkish pressure in 1999. In more recent years, while Türkiye struck deals with Iran (and Russia) in the Astana Process over Syria, Iran’s direct support to PKK has been limited – but suspicion persists. Conversely, Iran is wary of Türkiye’s ties with Kurdish groups hostile to Tehran. For example, Iran believes Türkiye has at times supported (or at least tolerated) the activities of Iranian Kurdish dissident parties like PDKI and Komala based in Iraqi Kurdistan. There were also incidents in 2021–2022 where Iran accused Türkiye’s intelligence of helping smuggle Iranian Kurdish activists out of Iran. This Kurdish dimension creates an undercurrent of distrust – both sides fear the other could use Kurdish insurgents as a proxy weapon.
Espionage and Assassinations: The covert dimension of Iran–Türkiye rivalry has occasionally turned lethal on Turkish soil. In 2019 and 2020, two Iranian dissidents were assassinated in Türkiye (Masoud Molavi in Istanbul and Habib Chaab’s kidnapping mentioned earlier), operations widely attributed to Iran’s agents. Turkish authorities quietly identified Iranian suspects and reportedly expelled an Iranian diplomat involved. Additionally in mid-2022, Turkish intelligence foiled an IRGC plot to assassinate Israeli tourists in Istanbul detaining several Iranian agents – a move that led to Türkiye pointedly warning Iran against conducting terror operations on its territory. Each such incident further poisons the well of bilateral trust. Iran’s use of Türkiye as a staging ground for covert ops (given Türkiye’s relative openness) has forced Ankara to push back to defend its sovereignty and international reputation. In turn, Iran remains deeply unhappy about Türkiye’s growing strategic ties with Iran’s archenemies, Israel (defence ties resumed in 2022) and Azerbaijan, suspecting Turkish soil could be used for Israeli or Azerbaijani espionage against Iran. The intelligence war between Iran and Türkiye thus runs in parallel to the public diplomatic sparring.
In summary, Iran’s extensive support for Shi’ite militias and political movements region-wide has been a major driver of conflict with Türkiye’s interests. From Syria to Iraq and beyond, Tehran and Ankara often find themselves on opposite sides of a sectarian-tinged divide – one backing Shi’a-aligned actors, the other leaning toward Sunni or Turkic ones. This competition manifests in proxy battles, war of words, and clandestine operations. Each country also fears the other’s meddling at home (Iran worries about pan-Turkists and Sunnis, while Türkiye worries about Iranian-backed sectarian or Kurdish plots). While the two powers have so far avoided direct military conflict, the pattern of ‘contested Middle East orders’ – Iran’s revolutionary Shi’ite axis vs. Türkiye’s more Sunni nationalist ambitions – continues to fuel their rivalry.
Geopolitical Implications and Future Outlook
Iran and Türkiye’s conflicting policies set the stage for an evolving power struggle, but also occasional tactical cooperation. Both nations are regional heavyweights with imperial legacies, with each seeking to shape the Middle East in line with its own interests. Going forward, several factors and external actors will influence whether Iran–Türkiye relations trend toward open hostility or managed rivalry:
Azerbaijan and the Caucasus: The Iran–Türkiye competition is likely to escalate in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan (Türkiye’s ethnically Turkic and Shi’ite ally) has emerged as a flashpoint in Iran–Türkiye relations. Türkiye’s staunch support enabled Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war – an outcome that alarmed Tehran. With Baku emboldened, Iran fears Azerbaijani irredentism, specifically, that Azerbaijan (with Türkiye’s and possibly Israel’s backing) might encourage separatism among Iran’s Azerbaijani Turks or even seek to redraw borders. Iranian war games on the Azerbaijani border in late 2021 and again in 2023 sent a message that Tehran is prepared to defend its territorial integrity. Going forward, if Azerbaijan pushes to create the ‘Zangezur corridor’ (a land link through Armenia to connect to Türkiye), Iran will vehemently oppose it – seeing it as cutting Iran off from Armenia and boosting Turko-Azerbaijani influence right on Iran’s doorstep. Such issues could bring Iran and Türkiye into sharper confrontation, albeit through posturing and proxy moves rather than direct fighting.
There’s also the wildcard of Israel: Iran is convinced that Israel has a presence in Azerbaijan to spy on Iran, and that Turkish-Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation could be directed against Tehran. Türkiye, while not as openly anti-Iran as Israel, may be sympathetic to initiatives that check Iran’s sway in the Caucasus. However, Türkiye also has to consider Russia in this theatre. Russia traditionally dominated the Caucasus and, although weakened by other conflicts, Moscow still acts as a moderator (it has peacekeepers in Karabakh and ties to Armenia). Türkiye and Russia have worked together to some extent in the Caucasus settlement, and Iran has engaged diplomatically with both. A delicate balance of power may ensue: Iran will deepen ties with Armenia (and possibly Russia) to counter the Türkiye-Azerbaijan axis, raising the prospect of a polarised Caucasus. Any miscalculation – say an Azerbaijani move on southern Armenia or an incident on the Iranian border – could spark a crisis drawing in Türkiye and Iran on opposite sides. This remains one of the most volatile frontiers of their rivalry.
Arab Gulf States: The relationship between Türkiye, Iran, and the Arab Gulf monarchies is a shifting triangle that will impact Iran–Türkiye dynamics. During the 2010s, Türkiye found itself at odds with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on some issues (e.g., the Qatar blockade and the Muslim Brotherhood), even as all-eyed Iran warily. Recently, however, Türkiye has reconciled with the major Arab Gulf states – President Erdoğan mended ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in 2022–2023, and Gulf investments have flowed into Türkiye’s economy. A more aligned Türkiye-Saudi-UAE front could coordinate to contain Iran’s regional influence, complementing the Abraham Accords bloc (Israel + Gulf) in opposing Iran.For instance, Türkiye and the UAE, despite past differences, now jointly decry Iran’s interventions in Arab countries. Saudi Arabia, after a China-brokered détente with Iran in 2023, is cautiously improving relations with Tehran – if that truce holds, Saudi–Iran tensions might cool somewhat. But even so, the Gulf states will welcome Türkiye as a Sunni power balancing Iran in places like Syria and Iraq.
We might see quiet Gulf financial or diplomatic support for Turkish initiatives in Syria (where Saudi and UAE also prefer to limit Iran’s footprint). In Iraq, Gulf countries could work with Türkiye to empower Iraqi Sunnis or constrain pro-Iran militias. There is also the issue of energy geopolitics: Türkiye aspires to be a hub for Gulf–Europe trade and perhaps for oil/gas pipelines, which gives it an incentive to ensure that Gulf-Iran rivalry doesn’t destabilise the flow. If Iran continues its aggressive policies, Türkiye’s growing friendship with the Gulf states could solidify into an informal Sunni coalition encircling Iran. Conversely, if Iran genuinely normalises with neighbours (as the recent Saudi outreach suggests), Türkiye may find less appetite among Arabs to confront Iran – possibly tempering Ankara’s approach as well. In summary, stronger Türkiye–Gulf strategic coordination would box Iran in, whereas Gulf–Iran rapprochement might ease one front of Türkiye’s multi-layered rivalry with Tehran.
Russia: Both Iran and Türkiye have complex relationships with Moscow, and Russia often plays the role of arbiter or partner to one against the other. In Syria, Russia partnered with Iran in their ultimately doomed efforts to save Assad, yet also brokered deals with Türkiye (e.g., ceasefires in Idlib) to prevent Türkiye-Russia clashes. Going forward, despite the Assad regime’s downfall, Russia’s influence will remain significant.If Moscow remains engaged in the Middle East, it could use its leverage to prevent Iran–Türkiye clashes from boiling over – for instance by convening trilateral talks (the Astana process has been a platform where Russia, Türkiye, and Iran managed Syria’s situation). However, Russia’s war in Ukraine (and potential domestic strains) may reduce its bandwidth and clout. A weakened Russia creates an opening for Türkiye to assert itself more aggressively (as seen by Azerbaijan’s actions against Armenian forces when Russia was distracted).
Iran, for its part, has drawn much closer to Russia politically and militarily (even supplying drones for the Ukraine war), potentially forming an anti-Western bloc. If Russia firmly tilts toward Iran, Türkiye (a NATO member) might respond by doubling down on NATO partnerships and its own regional military presence – which could escalate tensions with Iran in conflict zones. On the other hand, if Russia values its ties with both and seeks stability, it might restrain Iranian or Turkish moves that threaten to upset the status quo. Though Russia’s power in Syria is greatly reduced by Assad’s downfall, it can still play a role regionally as a buffer or a catalyst in Iran–Türkiye relations – currently it has been more of a buffer, but its future posture is uncertain.
China: China’s growing footprint in West Asia adds another dimension. Both Iran and Türkiye court China for investment and trade – Iran notably signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Beijing and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while Türkiye is a key node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) via its “Middle Corridor” linking Asia to Europe. China’s interest lies in a stable Middle East conducive to commerce, not in sectarian or ethnic wars. Beijing has already shown diplomatic activism by brokering an Iranian–Saudi reconciliation. Potentially, China could act as a stabiliser between Iran and Türkiye as well. For example, through the SCO or other forums, China might encourage Ankara and Tehran to resolve disputes peacefully, emphasising economic cooperation. If Chinese infrastructure – railways, pipelines – are to pass through Iran to Türkiye (and onward to Europe), Beijing will push for tranquil relations and open borders. It’s plausible that China may use its financial clout (promising investments or energy deals) to incentivise both countries to compartmentalise conflicts. However, there’s a flip side to this: competition in China’s favor.
Türkiye and Iran might vie to be China’s preferred partner in the region. Türkiye offers stability and a NATO connection, but Iran offers huge energy resources and a geostrategic Gulf position. Should one feel China is favoring the other, it could breed jealousy. Additionally, China will not involve itself in granular disputes like Syria’s factions did – its influence is broad but not tactical. In summary, China’s rise likely dampens overt hostilities (neither Iran nor Türkiye wants to scare off Chinese investment with a war), yet it won’t by itself resolve the deep strategic disagreements. Both Ankara and Tehran will strive to leverage their ties with China to their own advantage while avoiding moves that jeopardise those ties.
The West and NATO: Although not explicitly mentioned in the question, it’s worth noting that external actors like the United States and EU also impact Iran–Türkiye dynamics. Türkiye is a NATO member (albeit an independent-minded one), while Iran is a decades-long adversary of the U.S. At times, Türkiye has cooperated with U.S. goals that counter Iran – for instance, hosting NATO radar as part of a missile shield aimed at Iran, or blocking Iranian oil finances (as Türkiye did partially during peak U.S. sanctions around 2013). In other cases, Türkiye diverged from the U.S. (e.g. over the YPG in Syria). In the near future if Iran’s nuclear issue boils over into a crisis Türkiye might be pressured to side with Western sanctions or even contingency plans, further straining Türkiye–Iran ties. Alternatively, a revival of the Iran nuclear deal could improve Iran’s economy and regional clout which Türkiye would then have to navigate carefully. The Caucasus is one area where Western powers (EU/US) have sought to broker peace (between Azerbaijan and Armenia) – any success there could reduce Iran’s fear of a Turko-Azerbaijani encirclement, indirectly calming one aspect of Iran–Türkiye tension. Essentially, the geopolitical chessboard includes Western moves as well, and Türkiye, straddling East and West, will sometimes align with NATO against Iran and other times mediate (as it did offer to host Iran–US talks).
Forecast
In the coming months or years, Iran and Türkiye are likely to continue a pattern of managed rivalry – intense competition and periodic crises. Despite this friction, both nations continue to avoid a complete breakdown or direct war, and both have demonstrated a pragmatic streak when needed. They share a long history of avoiding direct conflict. A Turkish expert highlighted this pragmatism as the ability to “compartmentalise” disputes and cooperate in other areas. Indeed, trade and energy ties bind them: Türkiye depends on Iranian natural gas imports (though levels vary, Iranian gas is significant for Turkish industry), and Iran values Türkiye as a conduit to global markets (one of Iran’s largest trade partners and a lifeline during sanctions). Barring unforeseen shocks, Ankara and Tehran will seek to preserve basic neighbourly relations – as evidenced by Türkiye’s refusal to join past Western embargoes on Iran and immediate recognition of the Islamic Republic back in 1979.
People-to-people ties also act as a buffer: tourism and cultural exchange between Iranians and Turks have grown, fostering some goodwill at the popular level.That said, the fault lines are real and possibly widening. If hardliners in Tehran decide to ramp up support for groups like the PKK to bog down Türkiye, or if Ankara’s nationalist leadership decides to openly champion non-persian minority causes in Iran, the gloves could come off. We might see a tit-for-tat proxy escalation – e.g., Iran stirring unrest among Turkish Alevis or Kurds, and Türkiye responding by empowering Iranian Azerbaijani or Baloch activists. Such a scenario would mark a dangerous turn, effectively turning Iran and Türkiye into open antagonists each undermining the other’s internal cohesion.The current rhetoric from both sides (“we can hit back where it hurts”) hints at this possibility. Much will depend on the leadership calculus on both sides: Erdoğan’s Türkiye has been assertive but also at times conciliary with Iran (he has a personal rapport with Iran’s leaders and helped mediate in past disputes), whereas a post-Erdoğan Türkiye might change the tone.
In Iran, meanwhile, the influence of the IRGC (which tends to be anti-Türkiye, seeing it as a NATO pawn and Sunni rival) versus the Foreign Ministry (more inclined to diplomacy) will shape policy.External influencers like Russia and China are likely to promote a modus vivendi between Tehran and Ankara – neither Moscow nor Beijing wants their two Eurasian partners locked in a conflict that destabilises Eurasian corridors. This could result in periodic summits and security dialogues that defuse tensions. For example, a joint mechanism to ensure neither side supports the other’s domestic insurgents could be revitalised (Iran and Türkiye in the past cooperated against Kurdish militants when it suited them, and recently Iran welcomed a call for PKK disarmament, signalling common ground on that issue. Also, both Iran and Türkiye face economic struggles and restive publics at home; they may conclude that confrontation is costly and instead pursue cautious cooperation – such as coordinating Afghanistan’s stabilisation, collaborating on transit projects (the International North-South Corridor via Iran and the Middle Corridor via Türkiye can actually complement each other), or jointly opposing independent Kurdish statehood. It could moderate their rivalry if they manage to find ad hoc alignment on some interests.
In conclusion, Iran–Türkiye tensions will likely persist as a prominent feature of Middle East geopolitics, driven by ideological differences, opposing alliances, and competing visions for regional leadership. Flashpoints like ethnic minority issues and proxy conflicts could intensify competition, especially in the Caucasus and Syria, where their interests collide most directly. External powers (Gulf states, great powers) may either exacerbate rivalry by siding with one against the other or help restrain it through diplomacy. Yet, given their history and interconnectedness, Iran and Türkiye are also expected to avoid a ruinous direct conflict, instead engaging in a high-stakes game of influence that stops short of war. We may see continued ‘Cold War’ style manoeuvres – propaganda wars, support for the opposing sides from third countries, economic jockeying – but also episodes of détente when mutual interests (like containing Kurdish separatism or boosting trade) come to the fore. The net effect is an ever-shifting balance between rivalry and pragmatic cohabitation. As one analyst aptly put it Tehran and Ankara have mastered being both friends and rivals; this duality will define their relationship in the foreseeable future barring any seismic regional realignment or internal political upheaval in either country.
By Babek Chalabi, a PhD student in IT and a South Azerbaijani activist based in Washington, D.C. Chalabi is the founder of ArazNews.org, a platform dedicated to raising awareness about South Azerbaijani issues.
Chalabi actively shares insights on Twitter at @BabekChelebi.