Alliances among nations are always driven by security necessities, imposed by shared threats and challenges—or perhaps a common enemy fostering animosity towards the allied nations. By agreeing on an alliance, allied nations aim to reach a certain level of deterrence and pressure, intended to make the enemy pay a heavy cost should it ponder aggression or an attack on any of the allied nations. All the foregoing is understandable and justifiable. However, what happened in the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, isn’t consistent with this concept of alliance. And this makes this alliance prone to questioning and even unfavourable assessment.
Just one day after concluding the agreement, the Turkish foreign ministry rushed to assert that the agreement doesn’t take aim at Tehran. Similarly, Pakistan has reiterated that the agreement isn’t aimed at a specific nation. Those statements were unequivocal messages of assurance to Tehran. Here a question arises: How could this agreement be beneficial given that Saudi Arabia remains beset by the Iranian threat?
Tehran is neither a strategic nor an existential threat to Ankara and Islamabad
Tehran is neither a strategic nor an existential threat to Ankara and Islamabad. But this isn’t the case for Riyadh. Yet there’s an intersection of interests between Tehran on the one hand and Ankara and Islamabad on the other regarding some issues. Iran and Pakistan agree on the Afghan issue. Both of them view the Taliban government as a shared threat. On the Balochistan issue, the two nations share the same concern, and there is security and intelligence cooperation between them in this regard. Additionally, Pakistan’s foreign policy adopts a realpolitik approach. Looking back at the not-so-distant past, specifically in the 1980s, when Tehran was entangled in the war with Iraq—which was backed at the time by the entirety of the Gulf nations—Pakistan provided spare parts for the American-made fighter jets possessed by Iran, such as the F-4 Phantom and F-14 Tomcat.
The Pakistanis have an unquestioning belief that their neighbour India is the source of threat and existential danger. Thus, it could be comfortably said that Pakistan never views Iran as a threat to itself, even if there are some contradictions of positions and views as regards certain regional files. But such disagreements will remain confined to these files, without causing disruptions or tensions in their bilateral ties. The two nations have traded missile strikes and drone attacks in the Balochistan region, with missiles hitting both Iranian and Pakistani territory. The tensions ended in a matter of days, and the two nations have turned the page for good.
As for Türkiye, its interests conflict with those of Iran on several issues, such as Syria, Azerbaijan, and perhaps Iraq. Yet there’s an intersection of interests, amounting to near-agreement in views, regarding other issues such as the Kurdish issue and backing Hamas. It would not be an exaggeration to state that Türkiye is the biggest beneficiary of the US and UN sanctions on Iran. Turkish banks and markets have turned into a venue for attracting massive funds and investments from Iran, with the latter aiming to circumvent sanctions. This is in addition to the commercial and historical ties between the two nations dating as far back as six centuries.
Türkiye believes that the Kurdish issue is the main threat and gravest danger to its national security. It is in full harmony with Iran in this regard. The two sides adopted a concerted position towards the referendum for the Iraqi Kurdistan region in 2017. The two sides were quick to condemn the move and declare opposition to it. They also conducted manoeuvres with the Iraqi state on the region’s border. In the same vein, when information leaked about schemes to arm the Kurdish opposition during the recent US-Iran war, Türkiye vehemently declared it was against the move, declaring solidarity with “the friendly and brotherly Tehran.” There’s another threat to Turkish national security, according to Ankara’s own perception: its dispute with its neighbour Greece over Cyprus. The strategic threats to Turkish security are essentially the Kurdish issue and the conflict with Greece.
The agreement doesn’t curtail the Iranian danger
In an article published on Alhurra TV’s website, Saudi writer Abdulaziz Al-Khamis highlighted a notable feature of Gulf trade agreements: they are often accompanied by an emotional dimension that is not formally signed by the parties and therefore does not impose any binding obligations on them. This points to a clear reality: the main gains from such agreements may lie in their emotional and psychological impact rather than in tangible security guarantees. Otherwise, how can the Houthi missile and drone attack on Aramco facilities in Jazan, just one day after the agreement was signed, be explained, particularly given the complete silence from Islamabad and Ankara?
The agreement is unlikely to have a meaningful deterrent effect unless Tehran and its proxies are explicitly identified as threats. In the absence of such a commitment, Saudi Arabia would continue to bear the principal burden and costs of deterrence. Reports and analyses have also indicated that the joint defence agreement does not necessarily entail direct military intervention; instead, it could involve logistical assistance, including the provision of weapons and ammunition, as well as intelligence-sharing and cooperation. However, a closer examination suggests that Saudi Arabia has little need for this type of support.
The kingdom already possesses advanced defensive and offensive capabilities, along with sophisticated early-warning systems, that are comparable to—and in some respects may exceed—those of Pakistan and Turkey. Its strategic partnership with the United States further provides access to intelligence capabilities, including early-warning and threat-monitoring systems focused on Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen, as well as the logistical support required to address potential threats. The agreement therefore appears to carry greater psychological and symbolic weight than substantive deterrent value.
Carrying the dispute into Iran’s geography
General Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force, once told a gathering of Revolutionary Guard commanders that Iran had surrounded its adversaries with a network of armed groups that he described as the “axis of resistance”. He portrayed this network as an impenetrable defensive barrier and an advanced deterrent front designed to prevent attacks on Iranian territory. If the architect of Iran’s network of allied militias could advocate such a strategy, despite the deeply ideological and organic nature of Tehran’s ties with these groups rather than a merely pragmatic relationship, a broader question arises: why have the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, not adopted a similar approach by confronting threats from their adversaries closer to their sources?
It is certainly not an easy undertaking, but Saudi Arabia has nevertheless sought to take up the challenge. Following the launch of Operation Decisive Storm and Iran’s direct military, intelligence, and economic support for the Houthi movement, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman warned at a press conference that, if necessary, the conflict could be brought to the streets of Tehran. Some Iranian and pro-Iranian Arab media outlets mocked the threat at the time, but subsequent developments demonstrated that Riyadh had, in fact, begun taking bold steps in that direction.
Saudi newspapers and official and affiliated television channels were also used to promote the causes of Iran’s non-Persian peoples, particularly the Ahwazi cause, while media platforms provided financial and political support to some of these movements. These are clear, established, and documented aspects of Saudi policy. What remains unclear, however, is what may have taken place behind closed doors and the extent and nature of any additional support Riyadh may have provided to these movements.
“Activating a popular front inside Iran, particularly in the Arab Ahwaz region, Balochistan, and Kurdistan, could serve as a strategic option for restoring the balance of deterrence with Tehran”
Saudi support for these groups was, of course, nowhere near the scale of Tehran’s backing for its proxies. Nevertheless, it represented a bold and noteworthy step, particularly at a time when Iran was at the height of its regional power and assertiveness. Saudi Arabia, however, did not pursue this course for long. For a range of reasons, Riyadh eventually chose to reduce tensions and pursue de-escalation with Tehran.
Now, with Iran weakened and exhausted and facing what can be described as a period of unprecedented vulnerability and defeat, it has intensified its attacks on Saudi Arabia, mounting an overt assault on the kingdom’s security and sovereignty. This raises a fundamental question: what is the value of concluding joint defence agreements if they have little or no practical impact on the confrontation with Tehran and its proxies?
Activating a popular front inside Iran, particularly in the Arab Ahwaz region, Balochistan, and Kurdistan, could serve as a strategic option for restoring the balance of deterrence with Tehran. Such support should extend beyond financial and media assistance to include sustained backing for movements and organisations representing these communities. It should be maintained on a long-term basis and remain insulated from any future agreements with Tehran. Iran’s conduct, the argument goes, has demonstrated that it can continue seeking to undermine the security of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states even after signing agreements aimed at de-escalation or non-interference.
Mohammed Hattab, Ahwazi freelance journalist at Dialogue Institute