The Middle East Forum, a US-based think tank, has published an extensive analysis by Seth Kaplan, a prominent researcher specialising in conflict resolution and political transitions, outlining a possible strategy for dismantling the Iranian regime’s structure and ultimately bringing about its collapse. Kaplan sets out several measures he considers necessary to achieve this objective. Among his recommendations is the creation of protected zones in peripheral regions of the country, with parts of the Baluchistan and Kurdistan regions identified as potential starting points. The proposal is discussed in the analysis’s fifth section, entitled “Establishing Protected Opposition Enclaves”.

Kaplan cautions that enclaves established exclusively in ‘ethnic minority-populated’ regions of Iran are unlikely to command the national legitimacy needed for a political transition and could even reinforce the regime’s claims that the opposition is separatist in nature. He argues that their purpose should instead be to provide a foundation for a broader national movement, gradually extending its political influence into Iran’s Persian-majority heartland.He concludes the section by stressing that the value of protected enclaves depends entirely on how much they strengthen a unified national opposition capable of sustaining leadership, coordinating political action, and demonstrating that a credible alternative government is ready to govern an Iran that is both stable and territorially intact.

My aim here is not to address the arguments put forward in Kaplan’s analysis, but rather to present the views of several individuals from Iran’s non-Persian peoples, particularly the Ahwazi Arabs, on the country’s future territorial configuration.

The modern Iranian state is ‘manufactured by the West’

Over the past two centuries, Iran’s territorial boundaries have undergone several changes. The process began with the loss of territories, including areas now situated in western Afghanistan and parts of the Caucasus. It continued during the Qajar era, when Iran exercised only nominal sovereignty over regions such as Ahwaz, Baluchistan, Eastern Kurdistan, and  South Azerbaijan. During the subsequent Pahlavi era, these regions were forcibly occupied, incorporated into Iran’s national territory, and brought under the state’s coercive authority. External powers, primarily Britain and Russia—both imperial powers at the time—played a pivotal role both in the separation of certain territories and in the occupation and annexation of others.

The formation of the modern Iranian state after the First World War would not have been possible without British military, financial, and political support. The United States later played a major role in shaping modern Iran, beginning with efforts to reform its financial and tax systems in the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods. These efforts were facilitated by the deployment of economic and administrative experts, including Morgan Shuster and Arthur Millspaugh. American support reached its peak after the Second World War, when the United States made extensive and substantial contributions to the establishment, construction, and development of Iran’s administrative institutions, infrastructure, military, security and intelligence apparatuses, as well as its agricultural, energy, education, and healthcare sectors. Through this involvement, the United States transformed Iran into a strategic ally that effectively served as a proxy “policeman” for American interests in the Gulf region.

Dismantling Iran ensures stability in the Middle East

Whatever the reasons that once prompted the West, particularly the United States, to help establish, sustain, and develop the Iranian state after the First World War, they no longer apply today. Indeed, current conditions warrant a diametrically opposite approach. For starters, the United States no longer needs a “buffer state” to contain Russia and prevent it from advancing towards the waters of the Arabian Gulf. Russia, meanwhile, has become an exhausted country, bogged down in the quagmire of Ukraine—a conflict it has failed to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, even after four years.

If the aim of preserving Iran as a unified and powerful state was originally to counter the rise of Arab nationalism during the 1960s and 1970s and to provide an ally for the newly established State of Israel, which was then surrounded by hostile Arab neighbours, that rationale has effectively ceased to apply for more than three decades. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict has subsided, with several major Arab states having recognised Israel and established formal diplomatic relations, while others are currently negotiating similar arrangements. The situation has, in fact, been reversed: Iran has become the most significant and dangerous threat to Israel’s security and stability, assuming, of course, that safeguarding Israel remains America’s primary objective.

Nevertheless, it is clear that American policymakers, along with various research institutions and media outlets, favour limiting any desired change in Iran to one of two options: forcing the regime to change its behaviour or, in the most extreme scenario, bringing about its collapse. In my view, this approach is rooted in America’s historical legacy in Iran, particularly its contribution to the modernisation and development of the Iranian state after the Second World War. The relationship between the two countries evolved into something resembling that between a parent and an adopted child, with emotional and psychological bonds so strong that the “parent” cannot bring itself to abandon or harm the “child”, even when the latter proves ungrateful or behaves badly.

Concerns that dismantling Iran could trigger regional chaos or a catastrophic crisis threatening oil flows and supply chains, while unleashing a refugee and migration crisis affecting European countries, are unfounded—provided that White House decision-makers can be convinced that dismantling Iran serves America’s strategic interests.

The evidence, from this author’s perspective, lies in the United States’ disregard for such purported risks in Iraq and Libya, where it intervened, with NATO’s support, to overthrow both regimes. In neither case did Washington have viable alternatives, such as an organised opposition capable of taking power. In Iraq, moreover, the United States deliberately dismantled the state apparatus, fully aware that this would plunge the country into complete chaos. Accordingly, the author argues that dismantling the Iranian entity cannot be regarded as a crime, particularly in light of the aspirations of the peoples within its territory who seek freedom and independence.

Both the Panama and Yugoslavia models fit Iran

Since this article is concerned with American intervention and the need to include the option of dismantling Iran among the possible scenarios for resolving the Iranian crisis, it is worth examining previous instances in which the United States successfully oversaw the disintegration of states and subsequently helped establish allied governments in the newly emerged countries.

The case of Yugoslavia bears striking similarities to that of Iran. Both are characterised by considerable diversity in their peoples, ethnic groups, languages, cultures, religions, and sects. These differences and divisions ultimately contributed to Yugoslavia’s breakup into several independent states when it faced the severe test of civil war, prompting intervention by the United States in coordination with NATO.

Despite these significant parallels, one challenge cannot be overlooked: the reservations of Pakistan and Türkiye, both US allies, about any potential changes to the territorial boundaries of Iran’s Baluchistan and Kurdistan regions. As I have noted in a previous article, Türkiye regards the Kurdish issue as a primary threat and a persistent danger to its own national security, a position on which it is fully aligned with Iran. Similarly, Pakistan has been engaged for decades in an intense and ongoing struggle against Baluch groups demanding independence for Baluchistan in southwestern Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the United States could reassure these two allies that such changes would not adversely affect the status of Kurdish or Baloch populations within their own borders, much as Washington managed to address similar concerns over the Kurds in Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, the United States could involve Ankara and Islamabad in developing and rebuilding the two regions of Kurdistan and Baluchistan, enabling them to establish a political or economic presence there. Such involvement could ease both countries’ concerns about the potential risks of these regions emerging as modern, independent states.

As for the “Panama scenario”, which unfolded in the early twentieth century when the United States sought to secure full control over the construction and operation of the strategically important Panama Canal after Colombia rejected American terms, a similar approach could potentially be applied to Iran, specifically in the Ahwaz region. This territory possesses the world’s third-largest oil reserves and its second-largest reserves of natural gas. Moreover, the territory of Ahwaz borders the northern coast of the Arabian Gulf and extends towards the Strait of Hormuz. Gaining control over Ahwaz and recognising its independence would therefore strengthen American influence in the Arabian Gulf, a vital strategic waterway, while permanently securing the region’s energy supplies.

One notable aspect of the Ahwazi Arab cause is that the countries bordering the Arabian Gulf, including Iraq, would be unlikely to oppose its independence. Rather, they might regard it as a formidable bulwark against potential future challenges from Iran.

Non-Persian peoples won’t be scapegoats for Persian nationalist ambitions

For a century, since the establishment of modern Iran, various peoples have endured persecution, deprivation, marginalisation, and discrimination on ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic grounds under successive Iranian regimes. Strikingly, even Persian opposition movements and parties challenging the ruling establishment have adopted the same approach towards these peoples. This reflects deeply rooted stereotypical attitudes prevalent among the Persian minority across its various political factions and social strata.

Consequently, there is virtually no trust between these non-Persian peoples and the Persian minority when it comes to a potential political transition or the future system of governance. This perception is further reinforced by the slogans and political platforms of various Iranian opposition factions, particularly the monarchists. These make no reference to pluralism, the establishment of a democratic system that respects these peoples’ right to self-determination, or the creation of a decentralised federal structure granting substantial autonomy to the regions.

The Persian opposition’s current discourse focuses almost exclusively on restoring a mythical bygone era of Persian glory, which in practice means reviving a legacy associated with bloodshed and the subjugation of other, non-Persian, peoples. As a result, these other peoples are, understandably, no longer interested in making enormous sacrifices to see the Persian minority return to power, appropriating their resources for the benefit of the Persian centre, only to leave them once again to endure deprivation, marginalisation, and persecution.

The Ahwazi Arabs, Kurds, Baluch, and Azerbaijani Turks have long sought international protection and recognition of their national rights, the restoration of territorial control, the realisation of self-determination, and the safeguarding of their national, cultural, and economic rights in their own homelands. These groups are not interested in participating in short-term alliances. Instead, they advocate for genuine and substantive international partnerships that would provide effective protection and lessen the risk of repression and violence from both the regime and Persian nationalist movements – both while fighting against the regime and after its inevitable fall. The Persian-centric opposition may continue to marginalise and deny these people their rights, but does so to its own detriment. Instrumentalising these peoples and their movements is both ethically indefensible and strategically unsound.

For non-Persian opposition groups to the Iranian regime to be effective, the United States, along with its European and Middle Eastern allies, should first recognise and support the cause of these groups, who collectively constitute the majority. These groups should be afforded meaningful opportunities to articulate their demands and their experiences of oppression including the securitisation of their lives by the Iranian state and by certain elements of the Persian opposition, without fear of reprisal or continued marginalisation. The Iranian regime’s fall is inevitable, but it simply cannot be achieved by an ethnically Persian plurality.

Conclusion

Any conclusion by American decision-makers that Iran’s fragmentation was a viable possibility would certainly not be unprecedented in modern history. Numerous examples from around the world demonstrate how new states have emerged following the dissolution of larger countries. While some argue that instability and chaos in the Middle East, which can generate enormous profits for arms manufacturers and energy companies, serve American economic interests, the strategic benefits and financial rewards would be far greater if the United States took the lead in stabilising the region. Under such a scenario, Middle Eastern countries would become US allies and develop close economic partnerships with Washington.

Ensuring justice for the diverse peoples within Iran’s borders would make a significant contribution to regional stability, bringing to a close a chapter marked by oppression, deprivation, and persecution, and paving the way for a prosperous and promising future, thereby advancing international peace and security.