There is a woman missing from the way Iran talks about women’s freedom. She is not necessarily absent from the streets, the protests, the universities, the workplaces, or the struggles against political repression. She is absent from the way those struggles are often understood and represented. Her experiences are frequently absorbed into a general story about Iranian women, a story that may speak to some of her struggles but rarely captures their full complexity.
She is the Ahwazi-Arab woman, the Kurdish woman, the Balochi woman, the Azerbaijani Turkic woman, and the Turkmen woman. She may be a university student, a mother, a teacher, a worker, a journalist, a farmer, or a political activist. She may be fighting restrictions on her body, unequal opportunities, economic insecurity, or expectations imposed upon her by family and society. But she may also be confronting circumstances rarely discussed when women’s rights in Iran become the subject of national debate.
Her struggle is not simply about being a woman in Iran. It is about being a woman in a particular place, within a particular community, and under political and social conditions that shape the possibilities available to her.
This distinction matters. We often speak about women’s oppression as though all women encounter the same structures of power in the same way. Yet a woman living in Tehran and a woman growing up in a peripheralised region may face very different obstacles to education, employment, healthcare, economic independence, and political participation. Their legal circumstances may overlap, but the conditions under which they experience those laws can be profoundly different. Feminist scholarship has long challenged approaches that treat gender as a singular or isolated category, demonstrating how intersecting structures of power shape the experiences of women differently (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991).
The question is not whether one woman suffers more than another. It is why some experiences become the national story of women’s oppression while the lives of women of non-dominant nations remain local, fragmented, and largely unheard.
The Problem with Speaking of Women as One
For years, the struggle of women in Iran has rightly attracted international attention. Compulsory veiling, discriminatory legislation, restrictions on movement and personal freedom, and the state’s interference in women’s private lives have become central subjects of political debate. The protests associated with Woman, Life, Freedom made this struggle impossible to ignore.
Yet the visibility of women’s resistance does not necessarily mean that the diversity of women’s experiences has become visible.
A movement can become widely recognised while still reflecting the experiences of some women more clearly than others. This can happen because media organisations, political movements, influential activists, and international audiences tend to recognise stories that fit familiar narratives. A woman protesting compulsory veiling in a major city may become an internationally recognised symbol of resistance, while a woman confronting poverty, inadequate public services, patriarchal restrictions, and political marginalisation in a peripheralised region may never become part of the same conversation.
Both women matter, but their experiences do not receive the same attention. Some stories become symbols of the struggle for women’s freedom, while others rarely make it into the national conversation.
The Woman, Life, Freedom movement itself illustrates this tension. The slogan Jin, Jiyan, Azadî, rooted in Kurdish women’s political activism, became widely recognised following the death of Jîna (Mahsa) Amini and the protests that spread across Iran. Its Persian translation, Zan, Zendegi, Azadi, travelled across linguistic, national, and political boundaries, becoming a powerful expression of collective resistance. Its expansion created possibilities for solidarity among women and communities confronting the Islamic Republic. Yet the movement’s universal appeal also raises questions about how political expressions rooted in particular struggles are incorporated into broader national narratives. The Kurdish origins and political significance of the slogan were not necessarily absent from public discussion, but their recognition did not always extend to the wider political demands and conditions shaping Kurdish women’s lives. A symbol rooted in a particular struggle can become nationally representative while the political circumstances of the community from which it emerged remain peripheral to the national understanding of liberation. The question, therefore, is not whether a slogan can unite women across communities, but whether the solidarity it generates also makes room for the histories, identities, and political demands from which it emerged (Ghaderi, 2023).
This difference becomes clearer when we look beyond gender alone. A woman’s circumstances are also shaped by where she lives, her family’s economic situation, the language she speaks, and the opportunities available in her community. Take a young woman from a low-income family in Balochistan. Her chances of continuing her education may depend not only on her abilities and ambitions, but also on how far she lives from the nearest school or university, whether her family can afford transportation, and whether there are realistic opportunities for her after graduation. Calling this simply a question of gender misses much of what shapes her life.
There is also something important to learn from Indigenous women and the way they have described their struggles. For many of them, the fight for women’s rights cannot be separated from what happens to their land, language, livelihoods, and communities. Losing control over these things affects more than cultural identity; it can change how women work, support their families, pass knowledge between generations, and imagine their future. Indigenous feminist scholarship challenges the tendency to treat women’s experiences as separate from colonial histories, dispossession, cultural authority, and the political conditions of their communities (Moreton-Robinson, 2000; Smith, 2012). Their experiences remind us that women’s freedom is connected not only to what happens inside the home or under the law, but also to what happens to the places and communities in which they live.
This does not mean that every non-dominant nation in Iran should be labelled Indigenous, or that their histories are identical to those of Indigenous peoples elsewhere. The value of this perspective is that it helps us see how women’s lives are shaped by wider relations of power, including the relationship between the central state and the communities beyond it.
The purpose is not to compare women’s suffering or decide whose situation is worse. It is to recognise that women do not all begin from the same place, and that any discussion of their freedom will remain incomplete if it ignores those differences.
The Oppression That Does Not Always Look Like Oppression
Some forms of control over women in Iran are easy to recognise. A woman is arrested for violating compulsory dress codes. A law denies her equal rights. An authority prevents her from participating in public life. These forms of repression are visible, and their consequences are difficult to ignore.
But for many women living in the country’s peripheralised regions, inequality takes other forms. It is often part of everyday life, woven into the conditions in which they grow up, work, raise their children, and make decisions about their future.
Consider a girl in an Ahwazi-Arab, Kurdish, or Balochi family who grows up speaking her mother tongue but has little opportunity to learn or use it in formal education. This is not simply a question of language. It can shape her relationship with school, affect how she expresses herself, and send the message that the language and knowledge of her home have little place in public life. Over time, she may come to understand that getting ahead means leaving something of her own background behind.
Think, too, of a mother who wants her daughter to continue her education but lives far from a university, with limited public transportation and few employment opportunities nearby. Or a woman in a rural community who spends much of her day working in agriculture, looking after livestock, or helping sustain a family livelihood, yet has little financial independence and almost no recognition for the work she does. These women are not necessarily prevented from pursuing a different future. The problem is that the road towards it is much harder for them.
A woman does not need to be formally excluded from university or prevented from entering a football stadium to experience unequal access to education and public life. When educational institutions and employment opportunities are concentrated in major cities, transportation is expensive, and public services remain inadequate, the opportunities available to women in peripheralised regions can be very different. What appears to be an equal right may, in practice, be far less accessible to a woman living in a colonised periphery.
This is one way of understanding structural violence. Harm does not always come through arrest, punishment, or a direct act of discrimination. It can also emerge from the way resources, services, and opportunities are distributed. A girl who leaves school because there is no accessible secondary school nearby may never appear in a report about political repression. Yet the choices available to her have been profoundly restricted. A right that cannot be exercised in everyday life offers little protection. The concept of structural violence draws attention to how social arrangements can constrain people’s lives, limit their opportunities, and produce avoidable harm without requiring a direct act of violence against an individual (Galtung, 1969).
For women in regions such as Ahwaz, Balochistan, and parts of Kurdistan, the relationship between their circumstances and the environment in which they live deserves particular attention. Water shortages, pollution, land degradation, and the decline of agriculture and other traditional livelihoods are not simply environmental problems. They affect household income, health, food security, and the ability of families to remain in their communities. Research on Iran’s water policies and environmental degradation has documented how water transfers, infrastructure decisions, and unequal resource management have contributed to environmental injustice and intensified the marginalisation of peripheralised communities, including Ahwaz (Hassaniyan, 2024).
When a family loses its livelihood or is forced to leave its home in search of work, women often carry much of the burden. They may take on additional responsibilities for children and older relatives, find ways to sustain the household with fewer resources, or give up their own education and employment opportunities. The damage caused by environmental neglect does not end in the fields, rivers, or industrial areas where it begins. It follows people into their homes and shapes the lives of women and children in particular. These gendered consequences should be understood as an analytical concern, rather than assumed to be identical across households or communities.
For this reason, the condition of the regions where these women live cannot be separated from the question of their freedom. Their opportunities are shaped not only by the laws governing women in Iran, but also by decisions about development, public investment, natural resources, and the future of their communities.
When the State Controls More Than the Body
The Iranian state’s relationship with women is often discussed through its regulation of dress, sexuality, family life, and public behaviour. These are important dimensions of state control. But power extends beyond the female body. It also concerns the conditions under which women can work, study, speak, organise, and participate in shaping their communities.
For women of non-dominant nations, this becomes particularly important when gender intersects with the unequal relationship between the centre and peripheralised regions.
The idea of internal colonialism offers one way of examining how centralised political structures can produce unequal relationships within a country. It draws attention to the concentration of political authority, the privileging of dominant cultural and linguistic norms, and the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities between regions and communities. The concept was developed through analyses of uneven relations between core and peripheral regions, including the economic, political, and cultural relationships that sustain regional inequalities (Hechter, 1975). Applied to Iran, it should be treated as an analytical framework for examining these relationships rather than as a label that automatically explains every form of regional disadvantage.
Rather than a single, homogeneous nation-state, Iran is a multination country composed of a sovereign, dominant Persian core and several distinct non-sovereign nations and peoples—including Ahwazi-Arabs, Kurds, Balochis, Azerbaijani Turks, and Turkmens—whose collective rights have been systematically denied in the construction of modern state sovereignty (Renas, 2023). Within dominant nationalist discourse, these nations are reduced to the status of qowm (sub-national tribes or ethnic groups) to obscure their historical agency and delegitimise their demands for self-determination.
Applied carefully to Iran, this perspective raises difficult questions. Why do some communities experience persistent economic and infrastructural disadvantages? Why are some linguistic and cultural demands treated as legitimate questions of social development while others are viewed through a security lens? Why can demands for local participation, cultural expression, or greater control over community affairs become politically sensitive?
These questions matter for women because political and economic marginalisation is never gender-neutral. When a region has limited employment opportunities, women often face additional barriers to entering the labour market. When healthcare and public services are inadequate, women carry a disproportionate share of the consequences. When public discussion is restricted, women who wish to challenge both state policies and patriarchal practices may have particularly little room to act.
Indigenous feminist thought also challenges the idea that development should be measured only through decisions made by central authorities. A road, industrial project, dam, or other development initiative may be presented as progress, but its consequences depend on who controls the resources, who benefits, and who bears the costs. When local communities have little influence over decisions affecting their land and livelihoods, women in peripheralised regions may experience the consequences without having a meaningful voice in determining them. This concern is consistent with Indigenous critiques of colonial knowledge, development, and the political authority through which Indigenous communities are represented and governed (Moreton-Robinson, 2000; Smith, 2012).
This does not mean that every difficulty experienced by a woman in a colonised periphery can be attributed to colonialism. Nor should the experiences of Ahwazi-Arab, Kurdish, Balochi, Azerbaijani Turkic, and Turkmen women be treated as identical. It means that gender inequality must be examined within the political, economic, and environmental conditions in which it develops.
The Uncomfortable Question: Who Speaks for Women’s Freedom?
There is another dimension that deserves more honest discussion: representation within the struggle for women’s rights itself.
Who gets to speak for Iranian women? Whose experiences are considered representative? And who decides which demands should take priority?
The Iranian women’s movement has produced extraordinary courage. Women have challenged religious authority, discriminatory laws, compulsory veiling, and the state’s interference in their private lives. Their resistance deserves solidarity, not suspicion. But solidarity should not mean that the movement is beyond criticism.
Political movements can develop their own understanding of what constitutes a legitimate demand. They may recognise certain forms of resistance while treating others as secondary or politically inconvenient. This can happen when women’s rights are discussed without sufficient attention to national, linguistic, and regional inequalities.
The problem extends beyond the absence of subaltern women from national and international representations of women’s resistance. It also concerns the conditions under which their experiences become recognisable as forms of oppression. Visibility does not necessarily produce recognition. An Ahwazi-Arab, Kurdish, or Balochi woman may become visible within dominant accounts of women’s liberation when she resists gender-based restrictions, yet her demands concerning language, cultural rights, political participation, regional inequality, or collective recognition may remain outside the established understanding of women’s freedom. The problem, therefore, is not simply insufficient representation, but the framework through which representation acquires meaning. When gender oppression is understood independently of the political, cultural, and socioeconomic relations within which it operates, women’s experiences become fragmented into separate categories: gender is recognised as a women’s rights issue, while language, national identity, political authority, and regional inequality are treated as distinct or secondary concerns. Such divisions obscure the relationships through which these forms of power shape women’s lives. The question is consequently not only how women of subjugated nations can become more visible within existing movements, but whether the prevailing understanding of women’s liberation must itself be reconsidered to recognise the political conditions that shape their experiences. This problem resonates with feminist critiques of single-axis analysis and with debates about recognition, in which cultural and political demands may be acknowledged selectively while structural inequalities remain intact (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991; Fraser, 2000).
An Ahwazi-Arab woman demanding better educational opportunities, recognition of Arabic in public life, and greater attention to the conditions of her community is not raising an issue separate from women’s rights. A Kurdish woman concerned about political repression, cultural expression, and women’s participation is not stepping outside the struggle for equality. A Balochi woman challenging economic deprivation and patriarchal restrictions is not dividing the women’s movement by asking that her circumstances be taken seriously.
Indigenous feminist thinkers have also questioned who has the authority to produce knowledge about women and their communities. Too often, subaltern women are discussed, represented, and spoken for by political leaders, institutions, or outside observers, while their own knowledge is treated as secondary. The same problem can arise in Iran. Women in peripheralised communities should not appear only as subjects of research, symbols of suffering, or supporters of political movements. They must be recognised as people who interpret their circumstances, produce knowledge, organise collectively, and formulate their own political demands. Indigenous approaches to research and knowledge production have long challenged the colonial relationships through which communities are studied, represented, and denied authority over their own knowledge (Smith, 2012).
The problem also extends to some opposition movements that present themselves as alternatives to the Islamic Republic. Rejecting religious authoritarianism does not automatically mean rejecting every form of domination. A movement can defend secularism and individual freedom while remaining committed to a centralised understanding of national identity that leaves little room for meaningful cultural and political equality.
The tensions surrounding the Kurdish political coalition formed in February 2026 offer a contemporary illustration of these unresolved questions. Following the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan, Reza Pahlavi criticised Kurdish political groups in terms of separatism and territorial integrity, prompting a public dispute over the legitimacy of Kurdish political demands and the political future of Iran (Martany & Sewell, 2026). This controversy does not, in itself, establish that opposition movements reject women’s rights. It nevertheless raises a broader question about the political boundaries of promised liberation: whether a future democratic project can accommodate gender equality while also recognising the collective political agency of subjugated nations whose demands challenge established conceptions of national unity and centralised authority. Women’s freedom cannot be separated from the political order in which it is promised. If liberation is imagined within a framework that determines in advance which collective demands are legitimate and which must remain outside political debate, the transformation of gender relations may coexist with the continuation of other forms of domination.
A change in political leadership does not necessarily produce a change in the distribution of power. If the future political order merely replaces religious authority with another form of cultural or political uniformity, many women may find that the language of power has changed while their everyday circumstances have not.
The Other Side of the Struggle: Challenging Patriarchy Within Communities
An honest discussion must also look inward. It would be too easy to describe women of subjugated nations only as victims of state discrimination and political centralisation. Patriarchal power does not exist exclusively within the state, and no community is free from the need to confront its own inequalities.
Women in non-dominant communities may face restrictions imposed through family expectations, customary practices, unequal access to inheritance, early marriage, pressure surrounding personal choices, or the assumption that public leadership is primarily a male responsibility. The nature and extent of these practices differ between communities, families, and social environments. They should not be generalised or used to stigmatise entire populations.
But they must be discussed. There is a contradiction when a community demands freedom from external domination while denying women meaningful freedom within its own social structures. Cultural preservation cannot become a justification for preserving every inherited practice. A tradition deserves to be valued because people can freely maintain and reinterpret it, not because women are denied the right to question it.
Yet this relationship between patriarchy and collective belonging is more complicated than a conflict between women’s rights and cultural traditions. For women whose communities experience political repression, cultural marginalisation, or threats to their collective identity, community relationships may also provide solidarity, belonging, and support against external domination. These relationships do not make patriarchal authority necessary for collective survival, nor do they mean that women accept it. Rather, they shape the circumstances under which women contest inequalities. Criticism of patriarchal practices can be appropriated by dominant political actors to portray subjugated nations as culturally backward, while appeals to cultural preservation or political solidarity can be used within communities to discourage women from challenging internal hierarchies. Women may therefore confront contradictory expectations: defending their communities against external domination while seeking to challenge the patriarchal authority exercised within them. Their resistance cannot be reduced to a choice between individual freedom and collective belonging. Feminist scholarship has also recognised the tensions between gendered authority and collective political priorities, including how the defence of group identity may sometimes obscure internal inequalities (Crenshaw, 1989; Fraser, 2000).
At the same time, challenging patriarchy within a community must not become a pretext for treating that community as backward or culturally inferior. Women should be able to criticise their societies without having their criticism appropriated to justify discrimination against those societies as a whole.
This is where Indigenous feminist thought offers a particularly important distinction. It resists the false choice between women’s rights and collective rights. Women should not have to abandon their language, culture, or community to claim autonomy. Nor should they have to surrender their autonomy in the name of cultural survival.
A woman can defend her language while challenging her family’s expectations. She can value her community while questioning its leadership. She can reject compulsory veiling while choosing to wear traditional clothing. She can oppose state discrimination without accepting every political demand made in the name of her community.
This is what genuine autonomy looks like: the freedom to make choices without having those choices dictated by the state, political movements, or patriarchal authority.
Beyond the Image of the Resisting Woman
Political resistance in Iran is often associated with the women who take to the streets, challenge security forces, or publicly defy the authorities. Their courage has drawn attention to the struggle for women’s freedom, and rightly so. But beyond the major cities, in the towns and villages of Iran’s peripheralised regions, many women face a different set of struggles, ones that rarely find their way into national debates.
Think of the Ahwazi-Arab woman whose work in the household or on the land is rarely recognised, the Balochi woman who gives up her education because continuing is no longer financially possible, or the Kurdish woman who wants to work but finds few opportunities in her area. There are also women who spend much of their lives caring for family members, preserving local knowledge, or keeping community traditions alive, without having their contributions recognised as a form of work or leadership.
Their lives may not attract headlines, but they tell us a great deal about how inequality operates in Iran’s colonised peripheries.
Politics is not confined to parliament, government offices, or the streets where protests take place. It is also present in decisions about whose region receives investment, whose language has a place in public institutions, whose work is valued, and whose needs are overlooked. For women in these communities, even the ordinary responsibilities of daily life can be shaped by decisions made far beyond their towns and villages.
The experiences of Indigenous women in other parts of the world offer a useful perspective here. They have long argued that knowledge of the land, local livelihoods, languages, and community relationships should not be dismissed as less valuable than formal education or political authority. Much of this knowledge is carried and passed on by women, even when their contribution goes unrecognised. Indigenous scholarship has challenged the ways dominant systems of knowledge marginalise community-based knowledge and privilege outside authority over local experience (Moreton-Robinson, 2000; Smith, 2012).
Women in Iran’s peripheralised communities also hold knowledge that rarely enters official accounts of development or national history. Their understanding of local agriculture, family networks, language, the environment, and community needs is part of how these places survive and function. Yet they are seldom given an equal role in decisions that directly affect their lives.
Their contribution should not be recognised only because they endure difficult circumstances. These women are not simply victims of inequality; they are workers, decision-makers, organisers, and holders of knowledge. Any serious discussion of women’s freedom in Iran must recognise not only the restrictions they face, but also the work they do, the knowledge they hold, and their right to shape the future of their own communities.
What Would Women’s Liberation Actually Require?
If Iran is to move towards a genuinely democratic future, women’s freedom must mean more than the removal of compulsory religious restrictions. It must include equal access to education, meaningful employment, economic independence, healthcare, political participation, and protection from violence. It must address unequal conditions between regions and recognise that women cannot enjoy the same opportunities when the social and economic foundations of their lives are so different.
For women of non-dominant nations, this also means taking linguistic and cultural rights seriously, not as decorative elements of national diversity but as part of the conditions that allow people to participate fully in society. It means recognising the importance of local knowledge and ensuring that communities have a meaningful role in decisions affecting their land, resources, livelihoods, and future. Crucially, it requires recognising the collective national rights of non-sovereign peoples—including the right to self-determination and political self-governance—as inseparable from the liberation of women within those communities.
A girl should not have to experience her mother tongue as a disadvantage in her education. A woman should not have to leave her region simply to find opportunities that should be available to her. A community’s economic and political circumstances should not be treated as irrelevant to the lives of its women.
And none of these demands should be postponed until after a political transition. The future of Iran cannot be built on the assumption that questions of national equality, regional development, environmental justice, and women’s rights can be addressed one after another. They are connected. A political system that fails to recognise this connection risks reproducing old inequalities under new institutions and a different political vocabulary.
The real measure of a democratic future is not simply whether women are allowed to enter public life. It is whether they have the resources, security, recognition, and political power to shape it.
The Woman We Have Not Learned to See
Perhaps the deepest problem is not that subaltern women have been completely absent from Iran’s struggles. Many have participated, organised, resisted, worked, and contributed for generations. The problem is that their experiences have too often been interpreted through other people’s priorities.
They have been expected to speak as women when gender is the issue, as members of subjugated nations when identity is the issue, and as citizens when the national question is being discussed. But their lives do not unfold in separate compartments. Their gender, language, economic circumstances, relationship to place, and political environment exist together.
An Ahwazi-Arab woman should not have to explain why the conditions of Ahwaz matter to her freedom. A Kurdish woman should not have to separate her political circumstances from her experience of gender. A Balochi woman should not have to demonstrate that poverty, education, and public services are women’s issues. An Azerbaijani Turkic or Turkmen woman should not have to choose between cultural continuity and the promise of modern life. Nor should Persian women be confined to a single image or experience of womanhood. Their struggles, too, are diverse and deserve to be understood in their social and economic contexts.
The point is not to create a new category of women competing for attention. It is to challenge the habit of speaking about women as though their circumstances are interchangeable.
A woman is not free simply because the state stops telling her what to wear. She is not free if she cannot earn an independent living, access education, participate in decisions affecting her community, or challenge the authority exercised over her life. And she is not free if the political movements promising a better future have already decided which of her demands are acceptable and which must wait.
The question we should ask is larger than whether Iran will one day become a country in which women are free. It is whether that freedom will reach the woman in the village as well as the woman in the capital, the woman who speaks a marginalised language as well as the woman whose language dominates public institutions, and the woman whose labour and knowledge remain unrecognised.
Women’s liberation cannot be measured by the freedom of the most visible woman while the circumstances of the least visible remain unchanged. The woman within the woman is not another identity to be added to an already crowded political debate. She is a reminder that behind every national claim about equality are individual lives, shaped by different histories, relationships, and unequal possibilities. Until those lives, voices, and forms of knowledge become part of how Iran understands women’s freedom, the country will continue to celebrate a struggle whose full meaning it has yet to confront.
About the authors

Malika Salah, PhD in Development Studies, Independent Researcher, Harmful Practices Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA), London, United Kingdom: linkedin.com/in/malika-salah-271375301.
Mostafa Hetteh, Post-Doctoral Researcher in Politics-law. Expert on Iran, GCC, Near &Middle East and Canada geopolitics. LinkedIn Profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mostafa-hetteh.
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