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Negotiations as Strategy to Manage U.S. Pressure: Why Iran is Failing This Time

Iran uses negotiations tactically, even after years of hostile rhetoric

Date:

 ​By: Kamil Alboshoka

Introduction

For years, the Iranian regime has treated negotiations with the United States as a calculated tool to ease international pressure rather than to reach genuine resolutions. By prolonging diplomatic talks, the regime has repeatedly managed to secure short-term sanctions relief, which in turn has allowed it to pursue its nuclear ambitions and bolster its ballistic missile capabilities. At the same time, significant revenues from oil and gas—particularly from the Ahwaz region—have been funnelled into projects that serve the regime’s strategic interests, including the support of allied groups in the region, often referred to as the Axis of Resistance. Throughout these manoeuvres, Iranian officials have maintained a forceful anti-Western stance and cultivated an image of victimhood, all while neglecting persistent domestic crises such as deepening poverty, worsening environmental conditions, and the ongoing repression of non-Persian peoples.

By 2026, however, Iran’s long-standing strategy of using protracted negotiations and deflection is facing significant setbacks. President Trump’s reinstated maximum pressure campaign, bolstered by credible military threats, direct attacks on nuclear infrastructure, and a unified regional coalition, has confronted Tehran with a level of opposition it has not previously encountered. As a result, the regime’s reliance on intransigence and delay has proven less effective. The vulnerability of Iran’s regional allies, highlighted by Assad’s fall in 2024 and the diminishing strength of Hezbollah, alongside mounting economic instability and growing unrest at home, has sharply reduced the regime’s leverage. These pressures have brought Iran closer to a critical juncture, where its traditional approach of stalling appears increasingly unsustainable.

Historical Context of Iran’s Negotiation Tactics

Throughout recent decades, Iran’s leaders have consistently used diplomatic negotiations to shield themselves from international pressure while quietly advancing their nuclear ambitions, expanding missile capabilities, and consolidating power through regional proxies and domestic crackdowns. Publicly, the regime has maintained a confrontational posture, often resorting to incendiary slogans against the West, Israel and the Arab World. Yet behind the scenes, Tehran has intentionally prolonged diplomatic talks to secure limited sanctions relief and gain valuable time, ultimately using these opportunities to strengthen the very programs that outside powers hoped to restrain. This approach has included diverting vast oil and gas revenues—predominantly sourced from the resource-rich Ahwaz region—into the hands of the IRGC and related strategic interests. Meanwhile, the local population in Ahwaz continues to bear the brunt of this policy, facing hardships such as forced demographic changes, diverted waterways, and severe pollution, despite the area’s substantial natural resources.

The following subsections illustrate this enduring pattern across key periods:

Pre-JCPOA Pattern (2003–2013)

The years before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) vividly demonstrated this strategic approach. Between 2003 and 2005, during negotiations with the EU3 (France, Germany, and the UK), Iran agreed to temporarily halt uranium enrichment under the Paris Agreement, allowing for IAEA inspections. However, once diplomatic and economic pressure subsided, enrichment activities quietly resumed. Similarly, the 2009 fuel-swap initiative—under which Iran initially agreed to exchange low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel—fell apart after repeated delays and demands to renegotiate the terms. These experiences set a clear pattern: Iran used negotiations to achieve short-term concessions, all while covertly advancing its nuclear programme.

The JCPOA Era (2013–2018)

Iran’s use of negotiation as a delaying tactic was most apparent during the JCPOA talks from late 2013 to mid-2015. The process was characterised by repeated deadline extensions and the adoption of an interim Joint Plan of Action (JPA), which imposed limited freezes on certain nuclear activities but permitted continued research on advanced centrifuges such as the IR-2m and IR-6. Notably, Iran retained its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium until the final phases of negotiations. Once the deal was implemented, the lifting of sanctions unlocked over $100 billion in previously frozen assets and oil revenue for Tehran. Much of this financial windfall was funnelled to regional partners: by 2018, Hezbollah was reportedly receiving $700 million annually, and Iranian backing for the Houthis, the Assad regime in Syria, and various Iraqi militias intensified. Observers and American officials frequently criticised the JCPOA for failing to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its support for proxy groups—areas that Tehran steadfastly refused to negotiate—thereby allowing the regime to pursue destabilising activities across the region while benefiting from the diplomatic process. [1]

Post-2018 Stalling Under Maximum Pressure

Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the reimposition of sweeping sanctions, Iran initially attempted to salvage the agreement by appealing to European nations for economic relief. However, by mid-2019, Tehran began systematically violating the deal’s restrictions—surpassing agreed-upon limits for uranium stockpiles, increasing enrichment levels first to 4.5% and then to 20%, expanding the number of operational centrifuges, and restricting international inspectors’ access. These nuclear escalations were accompanied by a surge in proxy activities, including attacks on commercial vessels in the Arabian Gulf, Houthi missile strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia, and the downing of an American drone. Throughout this period, Iranian officials portrayed themselves as victims of U.S. hostility while adopting a facade of reasonableness. This period starkly revealed the regime’s priorities: pursuing nuclear brinkmanship and regional interventions at the expense of addressing severe economic challenges at home. Meanwhile, firm U.S. policy and coordinated efforts by Saudi Arabia and its allies exposed Iran’s strategic weaknesses, denying Tehran the short-term gains it had achieved in earlier negotiations and underscoring its willingness to exploit regional instability for its own advantage.

Iran’s Human Rights Evasion Through Diplomacy

A core element of Iran’s strategy has been to leverage negotiations as a means of diverting attention from its ongoing human rights abuses and reinforcing its dominance over non-Persian peoples. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Ahwaz region, which generates most of Iran’s oil and gas income, yet its indigenous Ahwazi Arab people endure chronic poverty, widespread pollution, and systematic demographic manipulation. The regime has repeatedly confiscated land for Persian settlers and IRGC development projects, while diverting rivers like the Karun to central Iran—a practice that has triggered desertification and devastated the Hawizeh wetland. Lax enforcement of environmental protections has left Ahwaz city among the world’s most polluted urban centres. Rather than benefiting the local population, the region’s wealth is channelled into Iran’s nuclear and military ventures. Even during periods of sanctions relief, such as the JCPOA years, repression in Ahwaz intensified—evidenced by the harsh government response to the 2019 fuel price protests. This demonstrates how diplomatic engagement serves the dual function of easing international pressure while enabling continued domestic control and marginalisation. Historically, Iran’s pattern of using diplomacy as a temporary reprieve—rather than genuine compromise—has facilitated the advancement of its nuclear programme, regional influence, and internal repression. However, mounting pressure from the United States and its allies now threatens the viability of this approach.

Iran’s Current Failures in Managing U.S. Pressure

In 2026, Iran’s longstanding tactic of using drawn-out negotiations to delay action, ease international scrutiny, and further its nuclear and regional ambitions is proving increasingly ineffective. The regime’s refusal to compromise during the latest Oman-brokered talks has coincided with a much tougher U.S. stance under President Trump, revealing significant weaknesses within Tehran’s position. Military losses, mounting economic difficulties, widespread domestic discontent, and heightened diplomatic isolation have all contributed to undermining Iran’s leverage. This stands in stark contrast to earlier periods, when more conciliatory U.S. policies enabled Iranian leaders to deflect pressure and avoid fundamental challenges to their rule.

A central factor behind Iran’s faltering strategy is its unwavering stance on the nuclear issue. During the indirect talks in Oman in February 2026—conducted against a backdrop of heightened tensions and fears of conflict—Iran categorically refused to suspend or limit uranium enrichment, persisting with stockpiles enriched to 60% purity.

According to the IAEA, Iran remains the only non-nuclear-armed state to maintain such a high level of enrichment. Tehran also declined to expand the scope of negotiations to include its ballistic missile program or support for regional militant groups, insisting instead on a narrowly focused, bilateral dialogue centred solely on nuclear matters. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation even suggested that any reduction in 60% enriched uranium would only occur if all sanctions were lifted—an uncompromising position reminiscent of previous tactics, yet now encountering a much more resolute international response. This inflexibility is deeply rooted in domestic vulnerabilities. The regime is acutely aware that making concessions could reignite public unrest, especially in the wake of the brutal crackdowns on mass protests that erupted in late December 2025 over worsening economic conditions, water shortages, and systemic repression. Security forces responded with lethal force, resulting in thousands, by some activist estimates, over 36,500 killed, widespread arbitrary detentions, and a near-total internet blackout from early January. While these measures temporarily suppressed the uprising, they left the government economically weakened and politically isolated, with its legitimacy severely damaged and little room to compromise without risking further instability.

The Trump administration’s strategy has fundamentally altered the dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations, representing a stark departure from previous approaches. In contrast to the Obama administration’s JCPOA negotiations—which granted Iran reprieve and sanctions relief—and Biden’s attempts to revive the deal, Trump’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign in early 2025 has combined explicit military threats with expanded oil sanctions, tariffs targeting Iran’s energy sector and its trading partners, and direct warnings of severe consequences if U.S. demands remain unmet. Proposals to deploy a second aircraft carrier group and repeated assertions that American forces are “locked and loaded” have underscored this assertive posture. These moves followed the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes in June 2025 during the brief Iran-Israel conflict, where critical nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan were targeted and, according to U.S. officials, rendered inoperable for at least two years. The attacks exposed significant weaknesses in Iran’s defences, sharply reducing the effectiveness of its traditional reliance on proxy warfare and inflammatory rhetoric in the face of a determined Washington.

Unlike earlier U.S. policies that allowed Iran to delay and deflect, Trump’s blend of credible military deterrence, post-strike leverage, and uncompromising sanctions has left Tehran with little room to manoeuvre. The regime’s internal vulnerabilities—worsened by economic collapse and the aftermath of protest crackdowns—have further constrained its ability to seek relief. As a result, negotiations have shifted from being a tool for tactical advantage to a forum that highlights the regime’s fragility. Continued pressure now threatens either to accelerate instability within Iran or to compel meaningful concessions, signalling a crucial turning point in efforts to counter Tehran’s threats.

Why Iran is Failing ‘This Time’

The regime’s long-standing strategy of using negotiations to buy time is collapsing in 2026 because President Trump and his administration have seen through Tehran’s playbook and refuse to repeat past concessions. Unlike the Obama administration, which exchanged sanctions relief for temporary limits on Iran’s nuclear programme, or the Biden administration’s attempts at indirect engagement, Trump has raised the stakes by demanding comprehensive changes—including restrictions on missile development, proxy activities, and other destabilising behaviour. Backed by credible threats and a firm refusal to tolerate further stalling, the U.S. now insists on substantive compromises. This uncompromising approach has left Iran with few options, as its usual strategies of delay and manipulation no longer yield the desired results.

The Oman-mediated negotiations in February 2026 highlighted the limitations of Iran’s familiar diplomatic tactics. Although Iran’s Foreign Minister initially described the opening round as a “good start,” Tehran quickly reverted to its longstanding demands: restricting discussions to nuclear issues, insisting on the immediate lifting of all sanctions, and refusing to engage on ballistic missiles or regional proxy groups. In a marked shift from previous administrations, the United States responded by including its top Middle East military commander in the talks, signalling a tougher and more assertive approach. Iran’s ambiguous suggestion that it might consider discussing missile issues “at a later stage” echoed the same stalling language deployed in years past. However, this time, the explicit display of the U.S. military resolves disrupted Iran’s usual ability to steer negotiations, resulting in heightened mistrust and an inevitable deadlock.

The regime’s leverage has evaporated for three interlocking reasons:

First, its network of regional proxies has been effectively dismantled. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 severed Iran’s crucial supply route to Hezbollah, leaving the group significantly diminished after the 2024 conflict. Hezbollah’s ranks and leadership were devastated, forcing the remaining commanders to accept a ceasefire, even as Israel continued targeted strikes on their senior figures. In Iraq, militias that once acted with impunity now operate under the constant threat of U.S. retaliation. The Houthis, though still disruptive, are constrained by ongoing U.S. and coalition airstrikes, undermining their reliability as partners. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” that once encircled Iran’s adversaries has unravelled.

Second, Iran’s internal vulnerabilities have left it unable to withstand external pressure. The wave of protests that erupted in late December 2025 in response to economic collapse and soaring inflation prompted a brutal government response, with activist estimates of fatalities from the ensuing crackdown reaching into the tens of thousands by January 2026. The regime’s reliance on mass violence, arbitrary detentions, and extended internet blackouts betrays deep-seated insecurity—a leadership increasingly fearful of its own population and incapable of absorbing social or economic dissent.

Third, the regional and global environment has grown overtly antagonistic. Iran now finds itself isolated: U.S. and Israeli operations have eliminated key IRGC leaders, Syria’s new government has distanced itself and rejected Iranian influence, and other regional actors have made clear that any future agreements must include restrictions on Iran’s missile programme and proxy forces. Should Tehran attempt to accommodate U.S. demands, neighbouring the Arab Gulf states and other countries are poised to impose additional conditions, turning the negotiating landscape into a complex web of competing interests. The regime’s old strategy of exploiting divisions among its rivals has become obsolete.

These developments lay bare the regime’s underlying fragility. Years of promoting a so-called “resistance economy” have resulted in runaway inflation, a mass exodus of talented professionals, and deepening public disenchantment, even as the clerical and military elites continue to prosper at the expense of the broader population. Persistent and resolute U.S. pressure—applied through economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and credible military deterrence—without the distraction of hasty or flawed agreements, presents the most effective means of hastening the regime’s internal unravelling. Unlike previous cycles of confrontation and negotiation, Iran now finds itself depleted of time, resources, loyal allies, and justifications.

Conclusion

By 2026, Iran’s longstanding strategy of leveraging negotiations to stall for time, diffuse external pressure, and quietly advance its nuclear and regional ambitions has unravelled. The regime’s refusal to compromise on its nuclear program, the collapse of its proxy alliances following Assad’s ouster, Hezbollah’s defeat, and the violent suppression of domestic unrest during the 2025–2026 protests have stripped Tehran of its negotiating power. The Trump administration’s relentless application of sanctions, credible military threats, and insistence on substantive concessions—especially after the decisive strikes of 2025—has left Iran with no viable escape: making concessions could trigger renewed unrest at home, while continued defiance would likely provoke further escalation.

 

Kamil Alboshoka is an Ahwazi researcher and international law specialist at the Dialogue Institute for Research and Studies.

 

References

[1] Elleman, Michael. “Constraining Iran’s Missile Capabilities.” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Brookings Institution, March 2019.https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190321_missile_program_WEB.pdf.

"The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the editorial position of the Dialogue Institute for Research and Studies"

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